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In the first chapter, I focus on the extent of information-driven trading originating from 
order flows to capture the behavior of the market makers on an emerging market. With 
my supervisor, we modified the classical Easley et al. (1996) model for the probability 
of informed trading using a jackknife approach in which trades of one particular market 
maker at a time are left out from the sum of all buys and sells. Using the estimates from 
the jackknife approach, for each market maker we test whether the order flows 
associated with the particular market maker behaved significantly different from the 
others. Data from the Prague Stock Exchange SPAD trading platform are used to 
demonstrate our methodology. Finding significant differences in the probability of 
informed trading computed from order flows, we conclude that order flows could reveal 
the extent of information-driven trading and could potentially be used by regulatory 
authorities to identify the suspicious behavior of market participants. 
In the second chapter I analyze the potential conflict of interest between 
associated analysts and brokers. In contrast to the existing literature, with my supervisor, 
we do not analyze prediction accuracy and/or biases in analyst recommendations. 
Instead we focus our analysis on brokers and examine whether their behavior 
systematically differs before and after investment recommendations are released. The 
evolution and dynamics of brokers' quotes and trades are used to test for systematic 
trading patterns around the release of one’s own investment recommendation. In the 
model we control for brokers' responses to other investment advice and employ a SUR 
estimation framework. Data from the Prague Stock Exchange are used to demonstrate 
our methodology. Finding significant and systematic differences in brokers' behavior, 
we conclude that misuse of investment recommendations is widespread. 
In the third chapter, I analyze the risk preferences of bettors using data from the 
world largest betting exchange Betfair. The assumption of a constant bet size, commonly 
used in the current literature, leads to an unrealistic model of bettor's decision making as 
a choice between high return - low variance and low return - high variance bet, 
automatically implying risk loving preferences of bettor. However, the data show that 
bettors bet different amounts on different odds. Thus, simply by introducing the 
computed average bet size at given odds I transform bettor's decision problem into a 
standard choice between low return - low variance and high return - high variance bets, 
and I am able to correctly estimate the risk attitudes of bettors. Results indicate that 
bettors on Betfair are either risk neutral (tennis and soccer markets) or slightly risk 
loving (horse races market). I further use the information about the average bet size to 
test the validity of EUT theory. The results suggest that, when facing a number of 
outcomes with different winning probabilities, bettors tend to overweight small and 
underweight large differences in probabilities, which is in direct contradiction to the 



























































































V první části své dizertační práce se zaměřuji na odhad rozsahu obchodování na 
základě neveřejných informací pramenící ze způsobu chování tvůrců trhu na malém 
rozvíjejícím se kapitálovém trhu. Vzhledem k vysokému procentu blokových obchodů v 
letech 2003-05 mohli tvůrci trhu zaměřující se na velké investory získat významný zdroj 
neveřejných informací. Rozšířením modelu Easley et al. (1996) jsme (společně s mým 
supervisorem) navrhli metodologii, která umožňuje analyzovat specifické chovaní 
market makerů na českém kapitálovém trhu a vliv tohoto chování na obchodování na 
základě neveřejných informací. Vzhledem k výrazným rozdílům v chování jednotlivých 
market makerů naše výsledky, nikoliv překvapivě, naznačují, že čeští tvůrci trhu mají 
významný vliv na rozsah obchodování na základě neveřejných informací. Z našich 
výsledků dále vyplývá, že za současného regulatorního rámce jsou tvůrci trhu schopni 
obchodovat na základě určité informace po překvapivě dlouhé časové období. Tato 
studie by mohla přispět ke zlepšení detekčních mechanismů regulatorních orgánů v ČR, 
jelikož naše metodologie umožňuje detekci nestandartního chování jednotlivých tvůrců 
trhu. 
Druhá část dizertační práce analyzuje potencionální konflikt zájmů, který může 
vznikat mezi analytiky a obchodníky s cennými papíry. Na rozdíl od existující literatury 
neanalyzujeme (opět společně s mým supervisorem) kvalitu investičních doporučení, ale 
zaměřujeme se na chování obchodníků s cennými papíry a zkoumáme, zda se jejich 
chování liší před a po uveřejnění investičních doporučeních. Pro testování 
systematických obchodních praktik okolo uveřejnění investičních doporučení od 
analytiků pracujících pro určitého obchodníka s cennými papíry používáme vývoj a 
dynamiku kotací a obchodů tohoto obchodníka. Za použití SUR regresní analýzy naše 
metodika zachycuje i vzájemnou interakci chování různých obchodníků i analytiků. Pro 
demonstraci naší metodiky používáme data z Burzy cenných papírů v Praze. Naše 
výsledky naznačují na překvapivě výrazné odlišnosti v systematickém chování 
obchodníků v okolí zveřejnění investičních doporučení v ČR. 
 V třetí části dizertační práce se zabývám analýzou chování sázejících na největší 
online burze sázek – Betfair. Cílem této analýzy je bližší pochopení jednoho ze 
základních kamenů ekonomické teorie – rozhodování lidí v podmínkách nejistoty a 
jejich přístup k riziku. Sázení je jednou z mála situací v reálném životě, které se pro 
ověřování různých teorií o chování lidí v rámci rizika a nejistoty přímo vybízí. Všechny 
dosavadní studie na toto téma však opomíjely jeden podstatný fakt v rozhodování 
sázkařů - při výběru sázky hraje významnou roli nejen daný kurz, ale také výše sázky. 
Využitím dat z online burzy sázek nejen o výsledných kurzech na danou sázkovou 
příležitost ale i o, z dat vypočtených průměrně, vsazených částkách, tato studie velmi 
významně přispívá k analýze chování v rámci rizika a nejisoty. Studie, za použití nově 
navržené metodologie, testuje platnost jednoho z hlavních předpokladů EUT o 
racionálním přístupu k pravděpodobnostem. Moje výsledky naznačují, že sázkaři dávají 
při rozhodování v rámci rizika malým rozdílům v  pravděpodobnostech blízko 0% vyšší 
váhu než čistě racionálně smýšlející člověk a naopak velkým rozdílům v 


































“We are drowning in information, while starving for wisdom. The world henceforth will be run 
by synthesizers, people able to put together the right information at the right time, think 
critically about it, and make important choices wisely.” 





Financial markets are the heart of every modern economy. As the source of income for a 
significant number of people, they have always attracted the interest of corporate and individual 
investors, as well as academic researchers. Most of these analysts aim to understand why prices 
are set at a given level and what the determinants behind their evolution are over time. 
Therefore, they focus primarily on analyzing price time series and their characteristics. 
Nevertheless, even though prices represent the outcome of market forces and as such carry 
general information about market participants, they do not provide full information on 
individuals’ behavior. 
However, with increasing availability and richness of data we are able to answer more 
and more questions about the motivations and decisions of various (important) subgroups of 
market participants. The issue is no longer the lack of data, but inadequate methods to extract 
and summarize relevant information in a systematic way. In this dissertation, I design several 
new methods of data analysis and apply them to large publicly available datasets to demonstrate 
how one can use the existing data to understand the behavior of various market participants, and 
to identify potentially deleterious behavioral patterns. Specifically, I focus on two issues: 
whether and how market participants exploit a privileged position on the market stemming from 
their market power (chapter 1) or access to information (chapter 2); and  what  we can learn 
about decision making under risk and uncertainty and about the behavioral misperceptions of 
participants  in financial markets (chapter 3). 
In the first chapter I analyze the role of market makers in information-driven trading on 
an emerging market.  I focus on differences in the information content of trades of particular 
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market makers on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) in the Czech Republic. PSE is a small 
emerging market and thus every large order could significantly affect the price on the market. 
Yet, the market microstructure allows large investors to negotiate the price for large block trades 
with the market makers. Such a practice may lead to a situation in which one or several of the 
market makers are informed and thus have an advantage over the rest of the market.  
Due to the high share of block trades on the total volume traded in the years 2003-05, 
market makers focused on large customers may have a significant source of private information 
on the PSE. We extend Easley et al.’s (1996) model and use the intra-day data from the Prague 
Stock Exchange to identify suspicious trading behavior of particular Czech market makers. If 
some market makers possess private information about a large block order, they would behave 
differently than the remaining market makers. We test the hypothesis by comparing the sum of 
buys and sells for a given market maker with the overall sum of buys and sells; significant 
differences in the positions of market makers lead us to conclude that the market makers affect 
the extent of information-driven trading.  
Under current regulation market makers are able to protect their private information for a 
surprisingly long period of time. Although participants on the market may be aware that other 
market makers possess private information about the value of an asset, they are not able to prove 
it. Our study should, therefore, contribute to the development of detection mechanisms used by 
regulatory authorities on emerging markets in identifying the suspicious behavior of particular 
market participants. 
In the second chapter I focus on the conflict of interest between associated analysts and 
traders, specifically the potential misuse of investment recommendations. The integration of 
brokerage and analytical services on financial markets implies that associated brokers may have 
access to the investment recommendation before it is released to the public, and thus possess an 
informational advantage. I analyze the possible misuse of this advantage by analyzing the 
behavior of these participants prior to and after the investment recommendation is issued.  
 I do not use data from regulatory authorities as other studies do. Instead, I rely on high-
frequency data from the Prague Stock Exchange, which allows me to analyze analysts’ and 
traders’ behavior on the intra-day frequency. The information contained in this data is used to 
analyze whether the trading behavior of the associated brokers differs before and after a 
particular investment recommendation is released. Basically, if we observe systematic patterns 
over a longer period of time, we can conclude that we are observing the misuse of investment 
advice.  The results confirm that on the Czech capital market the above-mentioned conflict of 
interest exists and is quite severe. 
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In the third chapter I analyze the behavior of agents on an atypical financial market – a 
betting exchange. I focus on the decision making process under risk and uncertainty using data 
from the world’s largest betting exchange, Betfair. Previous studies on this topic  have generally 
attempted to explain the usual characteristic of odd (price) data -  favorite-long shot bias, where 
bets on low probability outcome of events provide a lower expected return  than bets on high 
probability outcomes; an observation which is not consistent with standard EUT under the 
classic risk-averse utility function assumption. The main drawback of these studies on betting 
markets is the absence of data on bet size.  
I make several contributions to the literature on decision making under risk and 
uncertainty. First, I analytically show that bet size is key to the risk preferences of bettors, and 
that without this information the inference is biased and inconsistent. Using the extensive Betfair 
dataset I demonstrate that bettors bet different amounts at different odds, and provide corrected 
estimates of the risk preferences of bettors which, indeed, differ significantly from those of 
previous studies. 
However, this research also has broader implications for the general analysis of behavior 
under uncertainty, particularly the validity of EUT.  The results suggest that, when facing a 
number of outcomes with different winning probabilities, bettors tend to overweight small and 
underweight large differences in probabilities, which is in direct contradiction to the linear 
probability weighting function implied by EUT. These findings can be interpreted as a 
refinement of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), who report the same behavior of agents with 
respect to absolute values of probabilities. The results also support the theory of reference points 
in decision making under uncertainty. However, they indicate that people might use more 


























































We focus on the extent of information-driven trading originating from order flows to capture the behavior 
of market makers on an emerging market. We modify the classic Easley et al. (1996) model for the 
probability of informed trading using a jackknife approach in which the trades of one particular market 
maker at a time are left out from the sum of all buys and sells. Using the estimates from the jackknife 
approach, for each market maker we test whether the order flows associated with the particular market 
maker behave significantly differently from the others. 
Data from the Prague Stock Exchange SPAD trading platform are used to demonstrate our methodology. 
Finding significant differences in the probability of informed trading computed from order flows, we 
conclude that order flows can reveal the extent of information-driven trading and could potentially be 
used by regulatory authorities to identify the suspicious behavior of market participants. 
 
JEL Classification:  G14, G15, P34. 
Keywords: dealers’ market, emerging markets, informed trading, trading systems. 
 
 
* Email addresses: jan.hanousek@cerge-ei.cz and frantisek.kopriva@cerge-ei.cz.  
Address:  CERGE-EI, P.O. Box 882, Politických vězňů 7, Prague 1, 111 21, Czech Republic. 
The authors would like to thank Jan Bena, Randall Filer, Evžen Kočenda, and seminar and conference 
participants at Philadelphia, Milano, New York, FMA and MME. GAČR grant (402/08/1376) and Global 
Development Network grant support are gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of any of the affiliated institutions.  
A previous version of this work has been published in the Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 
61, pp. 204-229.  All errors remaining in this text are the responsibility of the author(s). 
† A joint workplace of the Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education, Charles University, 





1.1 INTRODUCTION  
A significant number of studies deal with the issue of insider or informed trading on 
developed and emerging markets. Starting with the seminal work of Kyle (1985), 
various models were developed for insider or informed trading and many empirical 
studies attempted to estimate the severity of this problem. Insider trading can be 
described as a situation in which the investor is trading based on private information 
that is available only to a restricted number of people. Although insider trading is illegal 
in many countries, the distinction between insider trading and informed trading is not as 
obvious as it may look.1  
To measure the probability of information-driven trading (PIN) Easley et al. 
(1996) developed a model now commonly used in the literature that is based on the 
imbalance of buy and sell order flows. Note that PIN is not exclusively an insider 
trading measure; it also captures informed trading by investors who are particularly 
skillful in analyzing public news. It has been shown by Vega (2006), for example, that 
the estimated PIN was actually higher after company reports become publicly available. 
There are two main sources of information: information coming from firm fundamentals 
(including information on mergers and acquisitions) and information coming from order 
flows. PIN may also be affected by large institutional orders, as their presence may have 
a substantial impact on market microstructure and the price of the asset, particularly on 
a small emerging market like the Czech Republic. Overall, the extent of information-
driven trading considerably affects the credibility of a given financial market as it also 
increases the cost of acquiring information on the appropriate timing of a trade.  
In the Easley et al. (1996) framework, informed traders act non-strategically and 
trade upon their inside information. However, informed traders often try to hide their 
information and react dynamically to the behavior of other market participants, naturally 
preferring a trading environment with a high degree of anonymity (see Barclay et al., 
2003; Anand et al., 2005; Boehmer, 2005; Lee and Yi, 2001 and Brunnermeier and 
Pederssen, 2005 among others). Hence, an electronic dealers’ market is an ideal 
platform for executing informed trades (see also Sherwood, 1997).  
                                                 
1 While there is a broad consensus that trading on the knowledge of, for example, company profits or 
disclosures is considered insider trading, there is  no similar consensus for trading connected with the 
execution of large orders or the dual trading practices of some brokers or market makers. 
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Obviously, trades using private information would not be negligible in size. Let 
us reiterate that the associated PIN is not necessarily an insider measure as it could also 
reflect large institutional orders. Typically, on a dealers’ market large institutional 
traders cannot hide their orders and as a result would cooperate with a chosen dealer, 
therefore sharing information about the total order limits (volume and price). Let us note 
that the execution of such orders is heavily dependent upon the particular market 
microstructure. The current literature does not identify the possibility of collusion 
among market makers and informed traders. Nevertheless, the particular market 
microstructure may stimulate investors who are executing large trades to share their 
private information with a particular market maker (MM). This is the case in the Czech 
Republic.  
In the present paper we use the dealers’ market (SPAD) of the leading segment 
of the Prague Stock Exchange, since we believe that the market microstructure of the 
SPAD trading system might induce the collusion of dealers and large institutional 
investors. In particular, the MMs and large investors would share private information 
and, therefore, the order flows coming from a given MM may become a significant 
source and determinant of information-driven trading on small emerging markets.2  
The Czech capital market microstructure allows investors to place limit orders 
only on a dealers’ market, whose trading lots are typically of a small size. Further, as 
the whole market is quite thin, any large order has a significant impact on the price of 
the underlying asset. Clearly, executing a large trade through market orders by hitting 
the quotes of MMs would produce with immense trading costs as even a few 
consecutive orders in the same direction would substantially affect the price. While in 
practice the use of private information could proceed on several fronts, large 
institutional orders are likely done via one trading channel, i.e., by using one MM. The 
fast use of private information may lead to a situation in which several MMs are 
informed, investors do not behave strategically, and information is quickly captured by 
the market. On the other hand, large institutional orders could lead to the strategic 
behavior of the MM, especially on a small market or when liquidity is not large enough. 
                                                 
2 For example, there are publicly known cases in which the Czech government was selling shares of the 
energy company CEZ. During a process such as this, one can assume that either the government or the 
company itself was participating in buying these shares back to keep prices high. 
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To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to analyze the extent of 
order-flow information-driven trading initiated at the level of MMs. We develop a 
methodology based on the Easley et al. (1996) model to detect the suspicious trading 
behavior of particular MMs on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE). By an innovative 
combination of PIN measurement and a jackknife approach, we leave out the trades of 
one particular MM at a time from the sum of all buys and sells. We then test the 
hypothesis that due to private information about a large block order, the MM behaves 
significantly differently from the other MMs, using the estimates from the jackknife 
approach. We find significant differences in the behavior of Czech MMs  and conclude 
that the MMs may not only screen out the large informed traders, but on less-regulated 
emerging markets  may greatly affect the extent of information-driven trading coming 
from order flows by sharing private information with key large customers.  Our 
methodology thus contributes to the detection mechanisms of order-flow patterns which 
could be used by other investors as well as regulatory authorities. Our results also 
contribute to current debates on market microstructure and its effect on large and small 
investors.  
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Whenever we talk about informed investors we should distinguish two cases: 
1) investors possessing private information originating in firm fundamentals; and 
2) investors (brokers) accessing information about large institutional orders. Both cases 
lead to an increase in order flow imbalance, but as mentioned above the second case 
would likely involve more strategic behavior of the MM. In addition, the second case is 
interesting to study in the environment of small stock markets, since it is typically 
associated with dual trading, information advantages that could last for a longer period, 
possible stealth trading, etc. Below we present an overview of the relevant literature on 
information-driven trading, order flows and stealth trading associated with the behavior 
of dealers or MMs. 
The first stream of literature deals with the problem of whether dual traders are 
informed or not and how they proceed with large orders.  Most theoretical studies start 
with the assumption that dual traders are informed traders and then investigate the effect 
of their trading strategies (see Roell, 1990 and Sarkar, 1995 among others).  Empirical 
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results for developed markets are inconclusive; for example Fishman and Longstaff 
(1992) viewed dual trading brokers at the Chicago Board of Trade as informed, while 
Chakravarty and Li (2003), when controlling for the overall trading profit, suggested 
that dual traders are uninformed.3 Nevertheless, an overall view of the literature 
suggests that the MMs or dealers might anticipate private information from the order 
flow. In addition, informed traders might achieve a more favorable price by breaking up 
their large orders into multiple medium-sized trades (a so-called “stealth trading” 
practice, see Barclay and Warner, 1993 for the first reference).4 The results, however, 
may vary across different market microstructures; for example, in a pure limit order 
market (the Stock Exchange of Thailand) informed traders use larger trades compared to 
dealership markets (Charoenwong, Ding, and Jenwittayaroje, 2010).  
The second stream of literature focuses on the overall information advantage of 
MMs, dealers or brokers rather than on a particular behavior like dual trading. It is well 
known that MMs facilitate price discovery compared to a pure auction with only public 
orders and that their informational advantage comes primarily from the obtained order 
flow (e.g. Madhavan and Panchapagesan, 2000 and Kurov and Lasser, 2004). Typically, 
the specialists are able to generate short-term trade profits, mostly as a consequence of 
the bid-ask spread. Nevertheless, in some markets large dealers act more as informed 
traders than as liquidity suppliers (see for example Wang and Chae, 2003, for a study on 
the Taiwan Stock Exchange). Since only brokers on the market are able to view the 
order flow of their customers, the informational advantage of the dealers on the market 
likely originates from the privileged position of direct access to the electronic exchange 
without any trading fees or trading delays. 
Another stream of literature is devoted to the degree of anonymity on different 
markets and the associated extent of PIN. For example, comparisons of trades on NYSE 
and NASDAQ suggest that NYSE, as a less anonymous market, has a lower extent of 
informed trading (Garfinkel and Nimalendran, 2003). Moreover, the change in listing 
from a dealership to an auction market (NASDAQ to NYSE or AMEX) leads to a 
significant decrease in the extent of information-driven trading. Therefore, either 
specialists on NYSE have a better ability to identify informed traders or the informed 
                                                 
3 The difference between these studies could be associated with the different level of regulation: the 
earlier study uses data from a period just before the FBI launched a federal investigation into fraudulent 
trading practices on the Chicago futures exchange. 
4 For more recent results see Anand and Chakravarty (2007) and Anand et al. (2005) among others. 
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investors prefer to trade on a market with a higher degree of anonymity (Heidl and 
Huang, 2002). Similar results were obtained by Grammig et al. (2001) from the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange via a comparison of non-anonymous floor trading  with 
anonymous electronic trading systems (IBIS and later XETRA), showing that informed 
traders prefer to execute their orders in the anonymous environment. On the other hand, 
as pointed out by Jain (2005), electronic trading enhances the liquidity and 
informativeness of stock markets. Therefore the global access of electronic trading may 
emphasize the differences between trading systems with market makers and anonymous 
trading systems. 
All of the above-mentioned studies assume that MMs are either using the 
information from the order flow to act against their customers or screening out informed 
traders. In addition, the results of Hanousek and Podpiera (2002, 2004) support the 
hypothesis that MMs in an emerging market (the PSE) may share private information 
with their key large customers. Furthermore, Hanousek and Podpiera (2004) present 
more intriguing results: Despite many improvements in regulation and increased trading 
volume the extent of information-driven trading was nearly the same for the years 1999 
and 2002. They point out that the extent of informed trading was about the same for 
shares of Ceska sporitelna and Erste Bank.5 Let us note that these stocks have little in 
common except for having the same set of MMs, therefore, one could ask to what extent 
the MMs on the PSE affect the probability of informed trading. 
The studies reviewed above suggest that the behavior of informed traders differs 
according to market microstructure, and that MMs are important participants on the 
market in that they are able to recognize informed traders. Several studies demonstrate 
the ability of MMs to identify informed traders and the effect this has on the probability 
of information-driven trading. They conclude that a higher degree of anonymity is 
associated with a higher probability of information-driven trading, and that informed 
and insider trading is a widespread practice in emerging financial markets. 
 
 
                                                 
5 In 2000, Ceska sporitelna (a major Czech bank) was privatized to the Austrian Erste Bank. Erste Bank, 




1.3.1 THE EASLEY ET AL. (1996) MODEL 
Our model is based on the well-known framework developed by Easley et al. (1996). 
We first briefly review their model and then introduce our extension. In all steps of our 
model, as well as in any empirical estimation, we control for the order flow size by 
assuming/using a regular lot as a trading unit.  
There exist three types of agents on the market: uninformed (noisy) traders, 
informed traders, and MMs. Trading is divided into n separate trading days. See Figure 
1.1 for a tree diagram of the trading day.  Before each day an information event might 
occur. An information event is defined as the occurrence of a signal s about the value of 
the asset. The probability that a signal occurs is α, and if a signal occurs, it takes on two 
possible values: low with probability δ and high with probability 1- δ.6 If a signal 
occurs, some fraction of the traders receive the signal. If no signal occurs, all traders 
stay uninformed. Using the scheme of Figure 1.1 we can express the probability of 








































































   (1.1) 
where S is the number of sells and B the number of buys. The first part of 
expression (1.1) denotes a no event day, the second part a bad event day and the third 
part a good event day. According to the assumptions of the model the days are 
independent and therefore the probability of observing a series of days with a given sum 
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The parameter θ = (α, δ, ε, µ) is then estimated using the maximum likelihood 
method.7   
                                                 
6 In the case of a bad signal the value of the asset is V , for a good signal V and for no signal unchanged.  
7 For the estimation we used a rearranged log likelihood function as presented in Easley et al. (2010).  
12 
 






































Note: The diagram depicts the structure of arriving buy and sell orders during a trading day, where α is 
the probability of the information event occurring, δ is the probability of bad news, µ is the arrival rate of 
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The probability of information-driven trading is the chance that a MM will trade with 
the informed trader and therefore can be computed as a ratio of the arrival rate of 




=PIN .        (1.3) 
This is actually the conditional probability of an information-driven trade given the 
occurrence of a trade at the beginning of a trading day. Therefore the numerator is the 
product of the probability of an information event times the arrival rate of informed 
traders. The denominator is then the probability of the occurrence of a trade, which is 
the probability of an incoming informed trader plus the probability of an incoming 
uninformed buyer and seller. 
1.3.2 LARGE BLOCK TRADES AND INFORMED MMS 
Our extension of the original model reflects the characteristics of a quote-driven market 
with a relatively small number of MMs. These MMs also usually act as brokers. As on 
every market, there are also various types of investors. We roughly divide them into two 
groups: large (institutional) investors and small (retail) investors. As these types of 
investors often have different needs, the MMs (brokers) are specialized on various types 
of investors or have at least a different approach to these investors. Small investors 
often open an account at just one broker and either use online trading systems to execute 
their orders by hitting the quotes posted by MMs or use some of the brokerage services.  
Large investors, by contrast, have specific needs in order to execute their large 
orders, as these orders often have a significant price impact. Large investors are 
therefore insiders, since they possess valuable private information (coming from the 
order flow) which has a significant effect on the price of the asset (Chakravarty, 2001 
and Golec, 2007 among others). According to their size, they are the key customers for 
the brokers. Large investors may thus get special brokerage services, and the fees for 
executing orders may differ significantly from those of retail customers. According to 
Schwartz and Shapiro (1992), large institutional investors accounted for 72% of the 
share volume on the New York Stock Exchange; given the relatively low number of 




On some markets, the problem of the different needs of different types of 
investors and the potential problem of better-informed large investors with a large 
impact on prices is solved by an upstairs market (Golec, 2007). However, similar to the 
market microstructure of the Czech capital market, in our model there is no upstairs 
market for large orders. Large investors thus often face a decision between checking the 
price and hiding the trade. Similar to the existing literature on stealth trading, we expect 
that large orders are usually broken into medium-size trades. As large investors face a 
decision on how to optimize the execution costs of their orders, using market orders 
(similar to small investors) to execute large trades is generally not suitable for them due 
to the large impact on the price and therefore the large execution costs. Thus, large 
investors may often prefer passive trading strategies, i.e. using limit orders. 
Nevertheless, on the quote-driven market only MMs may place limit orders (quotes). 
Therefore, large investors are forced to seek lower execution costs by negotiating with 
MMs. In other words, to optimize the execution costs of their orders, large investors are, 
in our model, compelled to negotiate with MMs about the possible execution of the 
orders, and MMs may exploit market making activities in order to execute these orders. 
There is latitude for collusion, or large investors could be pressured to cooperate and 
share their information with the MM. Some of these scenarios are described by Keim 
and Madhavan (1995), Chan and Lakonishok (1995), and Golec (2007) and confirm that 
larger trades may take several days to execute. 
Such implementation of large trade orders has a greater chance of minimizing 
the impact on the stock price; practically it means that the MM trades against his 
account and once he secures the deal (accumulates or sells shares) then a block trade 
with his client closes the trade. As in this scenario MM’s activities are used to hide the 
large trade, it is not rational for the large investor to contact more than one                                                                                                                              
market maker/broker  since this would  spread the information about an incoming large 
order. Therefore, at the beginning of the execution of his large order, the large investor 
chooses a trading channel, meaning he chooses a MM, which we can identify in our 
dataset. In other words, the MM has an incentive to act strategically in choosing the 
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optimal timing of several trades to process the whole large order at the best possible 
price.8 
 Our model, therefore, consists of two types of private information. The first is 
the private signal in the Easley et al. (1996) model: short-lived information about the 
underlying asset that is available to a relatively large number of informed investors. 
Similar to Keim and Madhavan (1995), we assume that in such a situation investors 
prefer market orders and execute their trades as quickly as possible. In other words, they 
do not act strategically, but come to the market as a result of the private information 
they received. The second type of private information in our model comes from the 
order flow. Information about the incoming large order is available only to the large 
investor and the MM with whom the large investor is negotiating about the optimal 
execution of the trade. Whereas the institutional investor announces the number of 
shares and the side of the trade, the broker tries to execute the order with the lowest 
possible execution costs. Similar to Keim and Madhavan (1995), we assume that an 
investor who possesses longer-term private information available only to a restricted 
number of people prefers to trade more discreetly, negotiating with some of the MMs on 
the preferable execution of the trade. Also, large orders executed through MMs have 
large price impacts and, therefore, using limit orders may significantly reduce the 
execution costs of the trade. Keim and Madahavan (1995) argue that the benefits of a 
passive trading strategy (limit orders) should be largest on thin markets where liquidity 
is low. Their analysis of the data on the equity transactions of 21 institutions shows that 
the execution time of trades is longer than one day: on average 1.65 to 1.80 days. 
However, this might be significantly higher for the Czech Republic due to the lower 
size of the market.  
  The first type of information flows to the market through market orders and 
therefore its revelation is not affected by the behavior of particular MMs. On the other 
hand, the large investor, to optimize his execution cost, chooses one of the market 
makers/brokers, who then executes his order and thus has other incentives than to 
balance his portfolio. In such a situation we in fact have two types of MM: informed 
and uninformed.  
                                                 




 Suppose that there is other information affecting the price of an asset: 
information about a large order that is independent of the above private signal of 
informed investors and that lasts for several trading days. In such a situation the large 
investor will contact just one MM, as otherwise he would be spreading the information 
to other participants in the market, which could increase the execution costs of the trade. 
Therefore we assume that only one informed MM has private information about this 
large order coming on the market from one of his clients. The large order consists of a 
random volume of shares and a random length K of trading days. Note that the actual 
number of days and the total number of shares can be limited by the price ceiling 
imposed by the client or/and by a particular deadline.9 As confirmed by several brokers, 
the typical practice is that a large order is inspected at the end of the trading session and 
new limits are set for the next day(s) or the execution of the order is stopped. In such a 
situation only one MM will have detailed information about the large order, i.e. private 
information. If more than one MM receives information about the large order and if the 
MMs do not act in consonance with each other, the order will be revealed to the whole 
market and the new value of the asset will be revealed immediately by the competitive 
behavior of two or more informed MMs.10  
If the MM is informed, we assume that he does not set quotes in a way that 
would immediately reveal his information about the order. Therefore, in the case of a 
large buy order the informed MM will strive to have the best quote11, that is, he will 
post his quotes for buys more actively and ultimately obtain the best quote with a higher 
probability than the uninformed MM. Although the other MMs may suspect the 
existence of the large order, they do not know the exact information of the trade, i.e. the 
limit price and the execution deadline. This is key information if the other market 
participants are to actively post quotes for buys and compete with the informed MM. 
Without this information, there is a risk that the MM would immediately stop the 
execution of the trade and the price would be too high.  
                                                 
9 Even though block trades must be reported in 5 minutes in the open session and in 60 minutes in the 
closed session, the behavior of MMs suggests that they are either aware of the block trade in advance or 
set the block trade ex-post.  
10 Given the trading environment (a dealers’ market) we expect a relatively low number of MMs, 
therefore, due to the competition of two or more informed MMs we expect that the information about the 
large order will be revealed quickly.  
11 The best buy and best sell quotes from all the market maker’s quotes. 
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Further, the uninformed MMs might find it difficult to compete with the price 
setting of the informed MM as they do not possess the inventory advantage of the 
informed MM.  Without inside information about the large order, the uninformed MMs 
will work to avoid risky unbalanced positions and will post quotes such that they would 
finish with somewhat balanced inventories. On the other hand, the informed MM, 
contingent on his information, might venture riskier positions from the point of view of 
uninformed MMs and therefore might be able to afford to actively quote only buys or 
sells. The uninformed MMs generate profit from the trading fees and spread; the 
informed MM, however, generates additional profit from proprietary trading. Thus he 
may compel the other MMs either to accept a lower spread and thus lower trading 
profits, or to give up market making activities for the particular stock. For the other 
investors it is also quite hard to trade upon just part of the information — the 
information that one of the MMs might be executing a large order — as they would face 
the spread costs while trading with only this incomplete information. They could, 
however, use such information to postpone the execution of their trade.  
Under these circumstances, the informed MM is likely to use his market making 
activities to execute the trade and thus will likely have a different balance of mandatory 
buys and sells than the remaining MMs.  Although the other market participants might 
be aware of the presence of a large order it could be difficult to use this information in 
the current trading system. Since the uninformed MMs have limited resources and 
therefore must balance their inventory position, it is especially difficult for them to 
compete with the informed MM. Even if an uninformed MM wished to trade using this 
information, he would face the risk that the large investor would stop selling the share. 
Again, the typical practice is that the large order is inspected at the end of the trading 
session and new limits are set for the next day(s). It is this — the restricted access to the 
limit orders of all investors, uninformed MMs with limited capital who raise money 
mostly from the spread, the non-existent upstairs market, and the possibility of non-
transparent pseudo block trades that move from block trades into the SPAD segment — 
that makes the market microstructure quite messy and enables some MMs to use their 
market making activities to hide the information stemming from large trades. 
Overall, since the major source of income for an MM is generated by the spread 
between the bid and ask prices, an existing large trade conducted via a specific MM 
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could lead to 1) collusion; 2) the other MMs’ spreads being close to their marginal 
costs; and/or 3) other MMs stopping trading. The informed MM, on the other hand, will 
trade actively only on one side (buy or sell), according to his private information. By 
and large it leads to a market with lower competition and wide latitude for price 
manipulation. 
The situation is well illustrated on the example of the publicly known case of the 
Czech government selling shares of the energy company CEZ. The publicly available 
information was that the Czech government started selling nearly 7% of its shares in 
September 2007 and stopped selling shares due to the financial crises in September 
2008. One of the commissioners helping the Czech government with the execution of 
the trade was MM4.12 The overall volume of the trade was around 4 billion CZK, i.e. 
9% of the total volume traded between September 2007 and September 2008 (see 
Table 1.1). Comparing the trading volumes by category, one can speculate that only a 
part of the governmental deal was conducted through mandatory trades; most trades 
during this period likely used the MM4 quotes as an indication of the limit orders of the 
Czech government.  
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Note: In the Mandatory Trades column, the main number is the overall volume; the number in the upper 
right corner is the mandatory buy volume; and the number in the lower right corner is the mandatory sell 
volume.  
Source: www.akcie.cz and authors’ computations. 
 
Table 1.2: Mandatory trades of particular MMs, Czech government selling shares of CEZ  
MM MM1 MM2 MM4 MM5 MM6 MM7 MM9 MM10 MM11 




















1.8 0.6 10.4 0.1 -0.8 -3.8 0.5 -4.5 0.0 
  7.8   5.8   7.9   5.3   9.3   14.9   5.5  11.5   4.2 
Note: In each column the main number represents the difference between mandatory buy and mandatory 
sell volume while the number in the upper right corner is the mandatory buy volume and the number in 
the lower right corner is the mandatory sell volume. 
Source: www.akcie.cz and authors’ computations. 
 
                                                 
12 We coded all the MMs in order to minimize possible bias in computations and analyses. The coding of 
market makers is available upon request. 
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Further, the fact that during this period the percentage of the market share of 
MM4 increased to 18% (overall 13% for CEZ) supports our hypothesis that  inventory 
advantage and  detailed private information about large orders give the informed MM 
the opportunity to trade more actively and to end up with an unbalanced inventory 
position (see Table 1.2). The execution of the trade ended with the first large price jump 
in September 2008, which also supports the notion that a large order is inspected at the 
end of the trading session and stopped when the price changes significantly. If any 
uninformed MM wishes to trade using the publicly available information that the Czech 
government is going to sell its shares, he would face the risk that MM4 would stop 
selling the share. 
This is likely what we see reflected in the behavior of the MMs as the 
governmental deal was conducted, since the price remained constant for nearly the 
whole period. MM4 was significantly more active on the quotes for buys (MM selling 
the asset) while MM7 and MM10 (large MMs) were mostly active on the quotes for 
sells (MM buying the asset). 
 
1.3.3 ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
To estimate the extent of information-driven trading due to large orders or, in other 
words, due to informed MMs, first we run estimations for the whole sum of buys and 
sells. Further, to estimate the PIN originating from large orders or other private 
information of the MMs we propose a procedure to estimate the PIN with and without 
the trades of informed MMs.  Therefore, we exclude one by one each MM’s trades from 
the sum of buys and sells and estimate the model. Having all the parameters θi = (αi, δi, 
εi, µi) estimated for each MM, we then test whether PIN using the estimated parameters 
θ = (α, δ, ε, µ) and PIN without considering the trades of a given MM are significantly 
different.  
Both estimators of PIN have asymptotically normal distributions and the 
estimators are positively correlated. We therefore use a cluster modification of the 
sandwich estimator as proposed by Rogers (1993) to estimate the joint covariance 




Having identified the informed MMs, we can estimate the effect of large orders on the 











= ,    (1.4) 
where θ = (α, δ, ε, µ) are the estimated parameters from the classic Easley et al. (1996) 
model using the sum of all buys and sells for each day, and θi = (αi, δi, εi, µi) are the 
estimated parameters using the sum of all buys and sells for each day without the trades 
of a given identified informed MM. The extent of information-driven trading stemming 
from the behavior of an informed MM is therefore the difference between the 
probability of informed trading with and without the trades of the informed MM. 
1.4 DATA 
For our analysis, we use intra-day data from the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) SPAD 
trading system for all stocks traded from 1 January 2003 to 31 August 2010, publicly 
available online.13 SPAD was founded in 1998 to increase the liquidity of the market. 
The trading system is designed as a dealers’ market with at least three MMs for each 
stock, who are required to quote ask and bid prices for a standardized number of shares 
with a limited maximum possible spread for each stock. If a given quote is the best 
available on the market, the particular MM is obliged to trade on the posted quote for a 
buy or sell.   
Each trading day is divided into two phases, open and closed. Actual trading 
occurs during the open phase of the system, from 9:15 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. each trading 
day. We use data on all SPAD trades during the sample time period. Each trade record 
in our database consists of security identification, date, time, type of trade, and price, 
and for the standard SPAD trades also the identification of the MM who traded it. We 
are also able to identify cross trades and trades conducted between the inventory of the 
MM and the MM’s client. Even though akcie.cz provides quite detailed information on 
trades, a significant proportion are nevertheless not transparent, as the mandatory trades 
are only around 40% of the total traded volume. Despite the increased regulation of 
block trades, these trades likely just moved from the segment of block trades into the 
non-transparent segment of SPAD trades with no identification. A key advantage of our 
                                                 
13 Available at www.akcie.cz. The last access for this paper was on 30 September 2010.  
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dataset is that we are able to identify not only whether the given trade was buyer- or 
seller-initiated but also which MM was on which side of the trade.  
The sample period consists of 1925 trading days. We focus on 15 companies 
traded during that period (see Table 1.3a and Table 1.3b in the appendix for descriptive 
statistics of market capitalization and traded volumes; KIT DIGITAL was traded only 
for a short period in our dataset).14 We have eleven MMs in our sample period: six 
brokerage firms and five banks.15 The MMs also differ in their specialization in 
different types of customer: retail vs. large institutional investors.  
As can be seen from Table 1.3a and Table 1.3b none of the eleven MMs on 
SPAD had a significantly higher market share in any of the analyzed stocks. The 
maximum market share reached about 30% for one MM and each traded stock had at 
least five MMs with a more or less comparable market share. The average number of 
trades during a day differs significantly among the stocks during the sample period. 
Only some of the newly introduced stocks attracted the attention of investors quickly, 
and the activity of some of these new blue chips on the PSE was not comparable to 
those of the already established stocks. Our model assumes the significant role of block 
trades as a source of information for some MMs; the data appear to confirm this 
assumption. Block trades are defined by a limit set by the PSE, and this limit is 
considerably larger than the market capitalization of the trading lots in SPAD. 
According to current regulation every block trade has to be registered within 5 minutes 
during the open phase (9:15 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.) and within 60 minutes during the closed 
phase.  
Table 1.5 (in the appendix) clearly shows that a significant percentage of the 
volume traded on SPAD used block trades. We might speculate that between 2003 and 
                                                 
14 Only six of them were traded during the whole period: two banks (Erste Bank and Komercni banka), a 
petrochemical company (Unipetrol), an electricity producer (CEZ), a telecommunications company 
(Telefonica O2) and a cigarette producer (Philip Morris). Another telecommunications company (Ceske 
Radiokomunikace) was removed from the market in September 2004. One IPO, Zentiva, was introduced 
to the market in June 2004 and removed from the market in April 2009. In February 2005 a real estate 
company (ORCO), already listed in Paris, started dual listing on the PSE and in June 2005 a media 
company (CME), already traded on NASDAQ for over 10 years, started dual trading on the PSE. ECM (a 
real estate company) and PEGAS (a synthetic non-woven textiles producer) were introduced in December 
2006, AAA (a car reseller) in September 2007, NWR (a coal mining company) in 2008 and VIG (an 
insurance company) in 2008.  
15 The brokerage firms are ATLANTIK financni trhy, a.s., BH Securities a.s., CA IB Securities, a.s., Fio, 
burzovni spolecnost, a.s., Patria Finance, a.s. and WOOD & Company Financial Services, a.s.; the banks 
are Ceska sporitelna, a.s., HVB Bank Czech Republic a.s., Raiffeisenbank a.s., ING Bank N.V. and 
Komercni banka, a.s. 
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2005, during which time there was a high percentage, the MMs who were focused on 
large customers also used standard SPAD trades to gather stocks in order to execute 
block trades. Such MMs are actually informed traders, and thus the block trades may 
have been an indication of a high level of private information on the PSE. The 
significant decrease in the percentage of block trades in 2006 was  likely caused by the 
increased regulation of MMs.16 Despite this increased regulation, the suspicious 
practices of unidentified block trades are still present. The forbidden unidentified block 
trades have moved to the segment of the SPAD market with no identification of the 
trading parties, leading to a situation similar to the one before 2006 (see Table 1.5). 
Therefore, trading practices probably remained the same; only the placement and 
reporting of the trades changed.  
SPAD was introduced to increase liquidity on the PSE. However, due to the size 
of the trading lots only medium and large investors could trade in the system. As 
Table 1.6 (in the appendix) demonstrates, the trading lots have varied quite a lot since 
over the sample period the prices of some stocks grew significantly. For example, the 
smallest trading lot (AAA) started at 0.01 million CZK, while the largest lot was 7.18 
million CZK (CEZ).17 Such a variance in mandatory minimum trading volume is 
another problem of the SPAD trading system, as it might present obstacles for 
uninformed and smaller investors; the design of the market thus attracts mostly large 
institutional and informed investors. For this reason the effect of changing the lot size 
can significantly affect the extent of information-driven trading, as according to the 
Easley et al. (1996) model informed traders are more likely to trade larger volumes. 
Regarding the significant increase of retail investors in the Czech Republic, therefore, 
reducing the lot size might attract more uninformed investors since on SPAD the fees 
are considerably lower than other trading channels. 
1.5 RESULTS 
For trading on the PSE in general, we observe that the structure of potential investors 
and the behavior of MMs follow different and unique patterns during the morning and 
afternoon sessions; we therefore estimate the extent of information-driven trading for 
                                                 
16  As of early 2006, all MMs and brokers are obligated to report their activities to the regulation 
authority, including their dealings book. 
17 Using the average exchange rate to USD over the period studied (~23.7 CZK=1 USD), the lot size 
varies from 25,000 to 232,000 USD. 
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each session separately. New information comes to the Czech capital market before the 
morning session and then again in the afternoon when there is news from U.S. capital 
markets. As the lull in information means only a negligible fraction of trades takes place 
between 12:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m., and even these are mainly automatic, we divide each 
day into two main parts: the morning session from 9:15 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and the 
afternoon session from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., to better reflect trading patterns and the 
specific nature of a small emerging market with a substantial foreign presence.  
For (automatic) identification purposes we first run a rolling window of 90 
trading days through our sample period and for each window estimate the extent of 
information-driven trading. We believe that the 90-trading day window is an optimal 
balance between the assumption of the underlying Poisson process being stationary and 
the length of the estimation moving window, which affects the precision of estimates.18 
Results are graphically presented in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 (in the appendix). Based on the 
patterns visible in these figures, we focus on particular stocks for which the rolling 
window analysis suggested significantly different behavior of particular MMs. While 
inspecting these figures, we could observe that for shares for which the PSE is the main 
market, the afternoon sessions always show higher PIN. By the same token, the dual-
traded shares show just the opposite pattern, i.e. the morning session has higher PIN. 
Possibly due to the strengthening of the regulation of the MMs by introducing the 
requirement to regularly report detailed information about their activities, the extent of 
information-driven trading was decreasing significantly until 2008, at which time the 
large decrease of traded volume due to the financial crisis again increased the PIN of 
most stocks. 
Our trading data consists of precise information on whether the trade is a 
mandatory buy or mandatory sell, contrary to most existing studies.19 Boehmer et al. 
(2007) point out, however, that using an estimation based solely on whether the trade is 
buyer- or seller-initiated leads to downward-biased PIN estimates and that the 
magnitude of the bias is related to the trading intensity of the securities. This may partly 
explain  why our results differ from  the results of Hanousek and Podpiera (2004), who 
                                                 
18 We have run the estimation also for shorter rolling windows. Our results suggest that that the 90-day 
rolling window still satisfies the assumptions of the model, as the results are similar. Detailed results are 
available upon request. 
19 If the quote is the best available on the market and if some investor reacts to it, the MM is obliged to 
execute the trade. 
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used data for the whole day and estimated whether the trade was buyer- or seller-
initiated using Lee and Ready’s (1991) methodology. Hanousek and Podpiera (2004) 
saw no improvement in the extent of information-driven trading between 1999 and 
2002. Nevertheless, our results suggest that all the blue chips experienced a significant 
decrease in PIN between 2003 and 2006.  
In Tables 1.7a and 1.7b (in the appendix) we present the results of tests for the 
time periods and stocks identified in the automatic identification phase described above. 
Rejecting the null hypothesis of the equality of the estimates means that the MM has a 
considerable imbalance between his mandatory sells and buys and hence that his 
behavior differs from the behavior of other MMs during the particular time period. 
PIMM tests how different the average trade imbalance of buys and sells of a particular 
MM is relative to the average trade imbalance of buys and sells on the market as a 
whole. By taking a different position on the balance of buys and sells, the MM is 
possibly hiding some relevant information from the market or is executing a large block 
order for his customer. Overall, our results suggest that during our sample period there 
were several MMs who behaved with marked differences from the other MMs.20 
The second columns of Tables 1.7a and 1.7b show the identified time period for 
the particular stock. To demonstrate the practical use of the method, all identification 
and estimation was done using a 90-day trading window. It is striking that most of the 
identified periods coincide with significant events or with news related to the particular 
stock. First we discuss the results for Ceske Radiokomunikace (CRA), which was 
removed from the market in September 2004 although the decision on removal had to 
be made in 2003. Therefore, our results that MM4 behaved very differently from other 
MMs in the second half of 2003 may suggest that he cooperated with some large 
informed customer who had better information about the buyout of CRA.  
Similarly, results for Telefonica O2 resonate with its privatization, indicating 
that some investors may have been aware of the privatization  and traded on this 
information ahead of time (see Figure 1.2 in the appendix for a  summary of the test: 
MM7, afternoon).  A further example of coincidence with important news is the result 
for CEZ. As we already mentioned, during 2008 the Czech government sold nearly 7% 
of its shares and our results confirm that part of the trade was done using MM4’s 
                                                 
20 The difference does not imply that the MM is an insider, as he may be processing a large trade order or 
using dual trading, which is not illegal in the Czech Republic. 
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market-making activities. The other results for CEZ are also connected with important 
news:  during the summer of 2009 the Czech parliament approved a law on distributing 
free carbon dioxide permits for firms, including CEZ.  
Other examples of important news that coincide with our results include the 
information about NWR buying a 25% share in Ferrexpo late in 2008.  In the case of 
CME, both the uncertain outlook of the firm after the financial crisis and, more 
importantly, information about Warner Brothers buying a 31% share in it constituted 
sufficiently important news to possibly have large orders traded through MM1 during 
the spring and summer of 2009. The financial crisis and the collapse of capital markets 
decreased the traded volume and therefore also increased the effect of every larger order 
on the price of the assets. This, together with speculations of whether ORCO would 
survive its financial problems, would support our results showing markedly different 
behavior of MM5, MM1 and MM7 between 2009 – 2010 for ORCO.  
 Our results confirm that a high percentage of block trades (around 30%) or large 
orders might have a significant impact on the behavior of some MMs, as seen for CEZ, 
Komercni banka and Phillip Morris between 2003 and 2005. Although the percentage of 
block trades decreased remarkably in 2006, the behavior of MMs likely did not change, 
as the SPAD trades with no identification experienced a significant increase at the same 
time. Our results suggest that even though market participants might be aware of the 
different behavior of several MMs, they are not able to compete with them due to the 
better information coming, for example, from detailed information about large orders.  
Lastly, we focused on the effect of changes in trading lot size on trading 
behavior and on PIN. As  already mentioned, changing the lot size may affect the extent 
of information-driven trading  since the informed traders are more likely to trade larger 
volumes. Smaller lot volumes might attract more uninformed investors. The estimation 
and test results are summarized in Table 1.8 (in the appendix).  As can be seen, most of 
the changes in lot size had a considerable effect on the extent of information-driven 
trading, as lot breakups attracted more retail and therefore more uninformed investors. 
Overall, smaller lot size means more trades with the particular stock, higher 
attractiveness for individual investors, and lower PIN. The exception is Erste bank (EB), 
whose shares did not react strongly to either an increase or a decrease in the lot size. In 
terms of information-driven trading, this is still consistent since the primary market of 
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EB is the Vienna Stock Exchange and trading in Prague is much smaller than in its main 
market. 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we analyze the behavior of MMs and their ability to maintain private 
information about large orders. We propose an automatic procedure using order flows to 
detect and test specific positions of particular MMs in an electronic dealers’ market. 
Trading data with one side of the mandatory buy/sell trade orders identified are used to 
demonstrate our method. 
We found significant differences in behavior among MMs on the Prague Stock 
Exchange, supporting the notion that they play a dominant role in affecting the price for 
a short time interval as well as for a longer period. Although the other participants in the 
market may suspect that some MMs possess private information about the value of the 
asset, they are not able to reveal the full information. Further, our analysis confirms that 
important changes such as decreasing the volume of the trading lot may affect 
(decrease) the extent of order flow information-driven trading.  
From the trading perspective, it could be argued that on a thin market MMs 
should be allowed to maintain private information about their sizable (block) orders so 
as to face threats of predatory trading and increased volatility during such trades. 
Nevertheless, the current practice of MMs in the Prague Stock Exchange could threaten 
minority and uninformed investors because prices then no longer convey all relevant 
information. This observation leads to the conclusion that further regulation might be 
beneficial; however, optimal policy from the regulatory point of view is not 
straightforward and is beyond the scope of the present paper. From our estimations it 
seems clear, though, that increased regulation by introducing so-called trading books (a 
detailed recording of all conducted trades) for each broker does not help. As discussed 
in this paper, (forbidden) block trades were basically transformed into SPAD trades 
with missing party identification. This might suit some large institutional players, but 
we believe that it results in a less transparent market with lower trading volume and 
lower informational content, which is potentially harmful especially on a market with a 
significant presence of foreign investors. This raises  questions about the introduction of 
an upstairs market (similar to NYSE, for example), a transparent trading segment that 
would serve institutional investors while keeping a variant of SPAD with smaller lot 
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size suitable for small individual investors. It seems clear from our results that an 
appropriate (i.e., much smaller) size of trading lot would reduce the amount of 
information-driven trading, and also would increase the trading volume and attract small 
individual investors. 
Given that this study uses an automatic procedure, has only modest assumptions, 
and employs a model that is relatively easy to use, we believe that the methodology in 
this paper could be taken up by investors as well as regulatory authorities on emerging 
markets to identify unusual order flows and/or detect the suspicious behavior of 
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1.8 APPENDIX  
Figure 1.2: Estimated PIMM for 
 
Note: The figure represents a graphical version of the test; suspicious behavior is identified when results 
for particular MMs (thick line) exceed the limits of the confidence interval.
 
Figure 1.3: Estimated PIMM for 
 
Note: The figure represents a graphical version of the test; suspicious behavior is identified when results 
for particular MMs (thick line) exceed the limits of the 
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CEZ using a 90-day rolling window, afternoon trading
 





















AAA 2007 3 22% 0.93 0.34 14.4 0.89 44.4 na 7 
  2008 1 75% 0.94 0.61 13.2 0.82 9.1 -80% 7 
  2009 1 13% 1.00 0.90 7.8 0.92 13.5 49% 6 
CME 2005 43 14% 0.81 0.56 18.3 1.30 1,409 18% 6 
  2006 50 50% 0.96 0.64 42.2 1.05 1,462 4% 6 
  2007 72 44% 0.99 0.68 44.3 1.12 2,106 44% 6 
  2008 14 130% 0.98 0.52 29.0 0.85 382 -82% 6 
  2009 25 69% 0.99 0.60 71.0 0.99 446 17% 6 
CEZ 2003 86 51% 0.64 0.31 18.4 1.10 146 58% 10 
  2004 202 54% 0.73 0.42 42.0 1.30 341 134% 9 
  2005 436 69% 0.68 0.45 124.5 1.00 736 116% 10 
  2006 569 61% 0.94 0.48 157.8 0.96 960 30% 9 
  2007 807 50% 0.98 0.44 119.1 1.02 1,362 42% 9 
  2008 465 83% 0.99 0.44 110.9 0.93 785 -42% 9 
  2009 465 44% 1.00 0.41 66.5 0.99 864 10% 9 
CRA 2003 11 45% 0.72 0.25 5.3 2.00 345 83% 8 
  2004 14 67% 0.61 0.29 9.8 1.10 444 29% 8 
ECM 2006 5 50% 0.99 0.53 84.4 1.51 1,432 na 6 
  2007 5 351% 0.99 0.60 44.7 0.95 1,203 -16% 6 
  2008 2 285% 0.98 0.51 25.0 0.61 261 -78% 7 
  2009 2 26% 0.98 0.80 8.2 1.05 308 18% 7 
EB 2003 191 7% 0.78 0.61 17.4 1.20 798 59% 6 
  2004 287 11% 0.85 0.63 31.6 1.20 1,187 49% 6 
  2005 334 14% 0.83 0.63 43.5 1.00 1,372 16% 8 
  2006 505 12% 0.94 0.66 54.0 1.05 1,601 17% 9 
  2007 411 25% 0.99 0.71 92.5 0.94 1,301 -19% 9 
  2008 133 68% 1.00 0.65 114.6 0.94 419 -68% 9 
  2009 264 22% 0.99 0.62 100.4 1.01 699 67% 9 
KB 2003 92 110% 0.65 0.40 38.0 1.00 2,418 16% 9 
  2004 124 120% 0.60 0.34 61.1 1.00 3,272 35% 9 
  2005 131 158% 0.64 0.43 95.1 0.90 3,441 5% 10 
  2006 118 90% 0.94 0.57 68.8 0.92 3,099 -10% 9 
  2007 166 82% 0.99 0.57 76.2 1.13 4,371 41% 8 
  2008 113 102% 0.99 0.59 100.7 0.97 2,970 -32% 7 
  2009 149 42% 0.99 0.50 74.3 1.06 3,929 32% 6 
Note: Mkt. cap. is market capitalization in billions of CZK at the end of the year; Turnover is the turnover 
ratio during the year as a percentage of Mkt. cap.; SPAD trades is the ratio of the SPAD traded volume on 
overall traded volume; Sys. Trades is the ratio of system trades (usually classic trades with an 
identification of the market maker) to the overall traded volume; APD is the average number of trades 
during a trading day; B/S is the buy over sells ratio; Price is the price at the end of the year; Price change 
is the percentage change of the price during the year; MM is the id number of the market maker.  
Source: PSE fact books, www.akcie.cz and authors’ computations.  
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NWR 2008 19 229% 1.00 0.59 101.1 0.90 73 na 7 
  2009 43 64% 0.99 0.65 87.2 1.02 162 120% 7 
O2 2003 94 69% 0.49 0.17 22.5 1.20 291 19% 10 
  2004 119 102% 0.52 0.16 35.9 1.20 369 27% 9 
  2005 169 171% 0.44 0.14 43.0 1.00 525 42% 10 
  2006 153 64% 0.88 0.41 62.8 0.92 476 -9% 10 
  2007 175 58% 0.99 0.40 51.4 1.13 545 14% 10 
  2008 137 68% 0.99 0.38 52.3 0.91 424 -22% 10 
  2009 135 49% 0.99 0.40 38.6 1.01 418 -1% 10 
ORCO 2005 na na 0.78 0.61 18.8 1.10 1,809 41% 6 
  2006 22 125% 0.96 0.76 65.1 1.09 2,755 52% 6 
  2007 23 159% 0.99 0.64 54.9 0.87 2,165 -21% 8 
  2008 2 630% 1.00 0.64 52.5 0.79 173 -92% 8 
  2009 2 109% 1.00 0.74 34.0 1.06 170 -1% 8 
PM 2003 30 64% 0.67 0.38 9.1 1.20 15,728 41% 9 
  2004 32 91% 0.72 0.41 22.2 1.10 16,776 7% 8 
  2005 35 101% 0.68 0.43 28.2 1.20 18,251 9% 8 
  2006 21 89% 0.93 0.46 23.4 0.92 10,840 -41% 7 
  2007 15 62% 0.99 0.47 16.0 1.08 7,933 -27% 7 
  2008 12 42% 0.94 0.38 10.1 0.92 6,026 -24% 7 
  2009 17 30% 0.94 0.39 9.1 1.03 8,796 46% 7 
PEGAS 2006 7 48% 0.99 0.35 93.3 0.91 753 na 7 
  2007 7 231% 0.95 0.48 35.0 0.93 751 0% 8 
  2008 2 237% 0.97 0.57 21.9 0.78 233 -69% 8 
  2009 4 71% 0.95 0.51 12.0 1.19 445 91% 8 
UNI 2003 12 72% 0.60 0.34 8.2 1.30 66 92% 8 
  2004 18 79% 0.68 0.35 9.5 1.00 98 48% 8 
  2005 42 122% 0.78 0.54 45.1 1.00 233 138% 8 
  2006 42 114% 0.95 0.59 47.2 1.01 234 0% 6 
  2007 61 75% 0.88 0.55 33.3 1.05 338 44% 7 
  2008 27 105% 0.98 0.60 28.0 0.90 150 -56% 7 
  2009 25 54% 0.98 0.53 17.7 1.11 140 -7% 7 
VIG 2008 83 2% 1.00 0.76 11.6 0.84 646 na 5 
  2009 121 1% 1.00 0.79 8.3 0.98 942 46% 5 
ZEN 2004 29 59% 0.65 0.30 17.0 1.10 758 50% 8 
  2005 43 232% 0.61 0.38 48.5 1.00 1,136 50% 8 
  2006 48 222% 0.94 0.60 71.7 1.01 1,268 12% 9 
  2007 37 300% 0.99 0.54 71.5 1.00 972 -23% 9 




       Table 1.4: Market share of market makers on the PSE during the sample period 
Stock AAA CME CEZ CRA ECM EB KB O2 ORCO NWR PM PN UNI VIG ZEN 
MM 1 
13% 24% 13% 12% 19% 16% 17% 11% 19% 20% 14% 17% 19% 28% 15% 
599 14544 21891 297 3517 20258 24664 8952 9763 9262 4478 2750 9612 1462 8726 
MM 2 
6% 12% 9% 8% 0% 9% 2% 7% 2% 3% 10% 11% 11%   8% 
222 6271 15131 199 114 12052 1985 5948 1070 1883 3389 2057 5382   4903 
MM 3 
    0% 2%     0% 0%     1%   0%     
    205 46     422 364     113   112     
MM 4 
9% 14% 13% 14% 17% 12% 14% 13% 16% 13% 13% 14% 16% 19% 14% 
555 7745 20703 355 3455 15005 20066 10307 8687 6285 4248 2514 7813 1092 8064 
MM 5 
26% 15% 9% 14% 15% 15% 12% 11% 17% 19% 13% 12% 18% 15% 9% 
2447 10821 16578 348 4220 20477 17868 9607 12779 11915 4308 2483 9215 848 5618 
MM 6 
10% 0% 10% 7% 17% 7% 12% 9% 2% 9% 11% 6% 5%   10% 
483 84 17367 169 2894 9427 17371 7173 1441 3747 3618 1351 2326   5943 
MM 7 
30% 19% 20% 16% 17% 16% 16% 25% 17% 25% 18% 19% 16% 21% 15% 
2017 12894 32078 423 4136 21734 24112 20021 12033 13958 6263 3711 8606 1207 8878 
MM 8 
    0%       1% 3%               
    885       857 2243               
MM 9 
    7% 10%   7% 8% 6% 12% 1% 5% 10% 2%   10% 
    12865 258   8537 10280 4722 5125 354 1240 1659 1025   6024 
MM 10 
7% 14% 13% 18% 15% 13% 14% 13% 15% 11% 14%   13% 17% 13% 
267 7500 22088 475 2904 15859 20736 10407 7142 5326 4473   6279 931 7908 
MM 11 
    6%     4% 4% 4%             5% 
    9960     4187 4884 3097             2916 
Note: Each row consists of the percentage of volume traded through mandatory trades and the number of mandatory trades of a given market maker during the sample 
period 1 January 2003 to 30 August 2010. Source: www.akcie.cz and authors’ computations. 
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    Table 1.5:  SPAD traded volume and percentage of block trades 
Stock Year 




CZK trades with ID no ID 
AAA 07-10 1.1 6% 49% 45% 42% 
CME 2005 5.9 17% 55% 26% 52% 
CME 06-10 98.8 2% 62% 36% 57% 
CEZ 03-05 445.6 30% 42% 27% 40% 
CEZ 06-10 1343.3 2% 45% 53% 42% 
CRA 03-05 14.2 32% 25% 41% 23% 
ECM 06-10 24.0 1% 58% 41% 53% 
EB 03-05 91.4 16% 62% 20% 59% 
EB 06-10 318.7 1% 67% 32% 62% 
KB 03-05 448.6 37% 39% 24% 36% 
KB 06-10 445.9 2% 56% 42% 52% 
NWR 08-10 89.5 0% 62% 37% 54% 
O2 03-05 472.4 53% 14% 32% 13% 
O2 06-10 365.1 4% 40% 56% 37% 
ORCO 2005 5.6 20% 60% 19% 56% 
ORCO 06-10 74.6 2% 68% 30% 63% 
PM 03-05 82.7 30% 39% 30% 36% 
PM 06-10 38.9 5% 44% 51% 41% 
PEGAS 06-10 25.3 4% 48% 47% 44% 
UNI 03-05 70.9 22% 45% 31% 41% 
UNI 06-10 133.9 6% 56% 37% 52% 
VIG 08-10 3.3 0% 76% 23% 69% 
ZEN 03-05 119.9 39% 35% 25% 33% 
ZEN 06-09 260.5 4% 53% 43% 50% 
Note: Volume is the traded volume on SPAD; Block trades is the percentage of 
the SPAD volume; SPAD with ID (no ID) is the percentage of SPAD traded 
volume with (without) an identification of the market maker; SPAD ID no cross 
is the percentage of SPAD traded volume analyzed in our study (standard SPAD 
trades through the market maker). 




Table 1.6: Changes in the trading lot size 






Min Max Min Max 
AAA Sep 07–Aug 10 3,000 4.8 56.5 0.01 0.17 
CME Jun 05–Aug 10 1,000 104 2317 0.10 2.32 
CEZ 
Jan 03–Oct 04 20,000 87 282 1.74 5.63 
Oct 04–Aug 05 10,000 257 552 2.57 5.52 
Aug 05–Aug 10 5,000 523 1435 2.61 7.18 
CRA Jan 03–Sep 04 3,000 180 535 0.54 1.61 
ECM Dec 06–Aug 10 500 120 2065 0.06 1.03 
EB 
Jan 03–Sep 03 500 1850 2975 0.93 1.49 
Sep 03–Mar 04 1,000 2685 3886 2.69 3.89 
Mar 04–Jul 04 500 3530 4236 1.77 2.12 
Jul 04–Aug 10 2,000* 196.1* 1743* 0.39 3.49 
KB 
Jan 03–Sep 03 2,000 1817 2680 3.63 5.36 
Sep 03–Jun 08 1,000 2210 4540 2.21 4.54 
Jun 08–Aug 10 500 1520 4295 0.76 2.15 
O2 Jan 03–Aug 10 5,000 240 628 1.20 3.14 
NWR May 08–Aug 10 5,000 59 624 0.30 3.12 
ORCO Feb 05–Aug 10 500 70 3785 0.04 1.89 
PM 
Jan 03–Mar 04 200 10400 20740 2.08 4.15 
Mar 04–Aug 10 100 3650 21451 0.37 2.15 
PEGAS Dec 06–Aug 10 1,000 166 848 0.17 0.85 
UNI 
Jan 03–Feb 05 20,000 34 181 0.68 3.63 
Feb 05–Aug 10 10,000 89 346 0.89 3.46 
VIG Feb 08–Aug 10 500 400 1478 0.20 0.74 
ZEN 
Jun 04–Jun 07 3,000 480 1571 1.44 4.71 
Jun 07–Apr 09 2,000 784 1448 1.57 2.90 
Note: LOT is the number of shares in the trading lot; Price and Volume Min (Max) is the 
minimum (maximum) price and volume in CZK during the corresponding time period. * 
indicates stock splitting.   
Source: www.akcie.cz and authors’ computations. 
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0.263 0.352 0.088 
2.46 0.014 





0.253 0.336 0.083 
2.28 0.022 





0.176 0.368 0.193 
3.69 0.000 





0.239 0.338 0.100 
2.43 0.015 





0.550 0.784 0.234 
2.00 0.045 
15.10.2003 (0.109) (0.088) (0.117) 




0.344 0.248 0.097 
2.22 0.027 
1.11.2004 (0.035) (0.038) (0.044) 




0.268 0.301 0.033 
2.35 0.019 
16.5.2009 (0.027) (0.028) (0.014) 




0.300 0.346 0.046 
2.06 0.039 
9.9.2008 (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) 




0.570 0.642 0.072 
3.30 0.001 
7.7.2003 (0.036) (0.034) (0.022) 




0.362 0.461 0.100 
2.48 0.013 





0.301 0.371 0.069 
3.79 0.000 





0.399 0.507 0.107 
3.43 0.001 





0.407 0.584 0.177 
2.90 0.004 





0.466 0.598 0.132 
3.22 0.001 





0.510 0.586 0.076 
2.07 0.038 
22.4.2010 (0.049) (0.051) (0.037) 
Note: PIMM is the estimate of information-driven trading using the sum of buys and sells excluding 
the buys and sells of a given market maker. Standard errors are in parentheses.  












PIN PIMM Diff T-stat P-value 
afternoon 




0.611 0.754 0.143 
2.55 0.011 
11.2.2010 (0.059) (0.046) (0.056) 




0.459 0.562 0.103 
2.40 0.016 
29.11.2004 (0.048) (0.047) (0.043) 




0.415 0.541 0.127 
2.01 0.045 
22.2.2008 (0.058) (0.056) (0.063) 




0.418 0.531 0.113 
3.10 0.002 
22.2.2008 (0.057) (0.057) (0.036) 




0.485 0.638 0.152 
3.50 0.000 
31.8.2004 (0.050) (0.043) (0.044) 




0.527 0.658 0.131 
3.89 0.000 
29.9.2005 (0.045) (0.036) (0.034) 




0.380 0.459 0.080 
2.63 0.008 
10.4.2007 (0.036) (0.037) (0.030) 




0.434 0.528 0.095 
2.79 0.005 
27.2.2010 (0.043) (0.048) (0.034) 




0.466 0.570 0.103 
3.02 0.003 
27.12.2004 (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) 




0.390 0.472 0.082 
2.38 0.017 
16.5.2006 (0.033) (0.038) (0.034) 




0.438 0.510 0.072 
2.09 0.037 
29.6.2009 (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) 




0.449 0.556 0.107 
2.03 0.043 





0.344 0.485 0.141 
2.00 0.046 





0.464 0.652 0.188 
2.32 0.020 





0.572 0.682 0.109 
2.06 0.039 
22.4.2009 (0.073) (0.076) (0.053) 
Note: PIMM is the estimate of information-driven trading using the sum of buys and sells except 
the buys and sells of a given market maker. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Source: authors’ computations. 
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Table 1.8: Extent of information-driven trading before and after changing the lot size 
Stock Date LOT 1 LOT 2 
morn/ 
PIN 1 PIN 2 Diff T-stat P-value 
aft 
CEZ 15.10.2004 20,000 10,000 
morn 
0.462 0.352 0.110 
1.52 0.128 
(0.038) (0.030) (0.072) 
aft 
0.517 0.416 0.101 
1.55 0.120 
(0.042) (0.032) (0.065) 
CEZ 12.8.2005 10,000 5,000 
morn 
0.333 0.232 0.101 
2.24 0.025 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.045) 
aft 
0.428 0.332 0.096 
1.48 0.139 
(0.041) (0.030) (0.065) 
EB 19.9.2003 500 1,000 
morn 
0.376 0.349 0.027 
0.47 0.636 
(0.043) (0.037) (0.057) 
aft 
0.500 0.521 -0.021 
0.25 0.802 
(0.061) (0.048) (0.084) 
EB 12.3.2004 1,000 500 
morn 
0.384 0.362 0.022 
0.33 0.744 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.066) 
aft 
0.538 0.434 0.104 
1.29 0.197 
(0.047) (0.043) (0.080) 
KB 5.9.2003 2,000 1,000 
morn 
0.523 0.352 0.171 
3.02 0.003 
(0.030) (0.032) (0.057) 
aft 
0.575 0.446 0.130 
1.95 0.051 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.066) 
KB 30.6.2008 1,000 500 
morn 
0.310 0.281 0.029 
0.80 0.426 
(0.031) (0.027) (0.036) 
aft 
0.367 0.266 0.100 
1.79 0.073 
(0.038) (0.030) (0.056) 
PM 12.3.2004 200 100 
morn 
0.741 0.498 0.243 
2.68 0.007 
(0.040) (0.037) (0.091) 
aft 
0.713 0.489 0.225 
3.20 0.001 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.070) 
UNI 24.2.2005 20,000 10,000 
morn 
0.476 0.334 0.142 
2.23 0.025 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.064) 
aft 
0.380 0.278 0.102 
1.45 0.148 
(0.060) (0.059) (0.070) 
ZEN 29.6.2007 3,000 2,000 
morn 
0.287 0.278 0.009 
0.21 0.837 
(0.032) (0.044) (0.043) 
aft 
0.299 0.144 0.154 
1.93 0.054 
(0.037) (0.061) (0.080) 
Note: The table shows the extent of information-driven trading within 90 trading days before and 
after a change in the lot size. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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existing literature we do not analyze prediction accuracy and/or biases in analyst recommendations. 
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The integration of brokerage and analytical services on a stock market creates 
conditions for a particular type of conflict of interest. This conflict of interest can 
manifest itself in two ways: First, analysts may have an incentive to issue biased 
recommendations; second, even if investment advice is unbiased, associated brokers 
may possess this information well before the other market participants and use it to their 
advantage (e.g. when associated brokers trade against a future recommendation in 
advance, the investment recommendation itself then has a significant effect on the 
market price).1 While the vast majority of theoretical and empirical research on 
investment recommendations focuses on the first issue, i.e., analyst behavior, in this 
study we explore the second mechanism using publicly available high-frequency data. 
We treat the recommendation of a particular analyst as new information that affects the 
decision-making of all market participants. Associated brokers, however, may have 
access to this information before it is released to the public and may thus possess an 
informational advantage over the rest of the market. The primary goal of our paper is to 
detect the misuse of this advantage by analyzing brokers’ trading behavior prior to and 
after the investment recommendation is issued, with a particular emphasis on their 
responses to their own recommendations. If there is no conflict of interest, we should 
see no systematic trading patterns a few trading days before or after an associated 
analyst issues a recommendation. 
Contrary to the existing literature, we do not perform our analysis on restricted-
access regulatory data, but on publicly available high-frequency data from trading 
platforms. In this way, we  not only introduce a new approach to the analysis of 
investment recommendations but also overcome the problem of missing data, as the 
                                                 
1 An increasing number of studies suggest that investors respond to investment recommendations and 
therefore imply the need for regulatory protection to avoid price manipulation and market abuse; see for 
example  Womack (1996), Barber et al. (2007), Irvine et al. (2007), Asquith et al. (2005), and Li (2005). 
According to Morgan and Stocken (2003), analysts use upward-biased recommendations to increase the 
trading volume and therefore the trading fees. Agrawal and Chen (2008) use stock inventories; their 
results indicate that dealers facing a conflict of interest tend to issue more optimistic recommendations. 
The significance of these problems is further supported by several steps taken by legal and supervisory 
bodies on developed markets, e.g., the well-known investigation initiated by New York State Attorney 




evolution of quotes and trades should easily replace the (often missing) regulatory 
information on stock inventories, portfolio structure, and proprietary trading profits.   
Moreover, publicly available data contain information that is available to the retail 
sector investor if he decides to enter a particular capital market, reflecting a wide range 
of expectations about future development including expert opinions and investment 
recommendations. Therefore, we might expect some reaction among the market 
participants to distributed market analyses. Less-informed retail sector investors may be 
especially sensitive to this information and thus follow these recommendations more 
closely.  Further, our high-frequency data consist of trades and quotes that capture most 
of the interaction of large brokerage firms with the retail sector. Our study thus can 
better capture the misuse of the informational advantage of large participants in the 
market through transactions with the retail market. We demonstrate our approach on 
data from the Prague Stock Exchange trading platform for the period 2003–2008, which 
we match with a set of related investment recommendations. To date, this is the only 
study analyzing the conflict of interest stemming from brokers' investment 
recommendations that does not use regulatory data and the first such study in the 
context of Central European emerging markets. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a short overview of 
investment recommendations in the context of an emerging market, with a particular 
emphasis on the market structure of the Prague Stock Exchange. Section 2.3 introduces 
the methodology, and a description of the data is given in Section 2.4. The results are 
presented in Section 2.5.  Section 2.6 concludes.  
2.2  EFFECT OF INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS AND EMERGING 
MARKETS 
Most research analyzing the effects of investment recommendations has been conducted 
on data from developed capital markets such as that in the U.S., where regulation is 
quite strict and requires a separation of brokerage and investment banking activities.2 It 
                                                 
2 Several U.S. studies, however, do not support further regulation of investment recommendations as they 
argue that investors are aware of the possible conflict of interest and discount biased investment 
recommendations (see Fisch, 2006 and Agrawal and Chen, 2008). Recently, the unbiased and information 
value given in these recommendations has been discussed (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2012) as well as its 
overall influence (e.g., Loh and Stulz, 2011). In addition, some of the existing U.S. capital market 
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is therefore not surprising that the results of these studies generally do not support the 
hypothesis that investors are systematically misled by investment recommendations. It 
would be a mistake, however, to extend these findings to emerging markets, for several 
reasons: (1) Emerging capital markets are typically not subject to a high level of 
regulation;3 (2) due to the smaller size of emerging markets, brokers have strong market 
power and substantial latitude for price manipulation; (3) small investors are 
inexperienced and unaware of a possible conflict of interest. In addition, Girard and 
Biswas (2007) show that compared to developed markets, emerging markets exhibit 
greater sensitivity to the unusual volumes associated with the release of new 
information such as investment recommendations. Moreover, control over large market 
participants is usually limited, as the regulatory authority often does not collect data on 
proprietary trading, broker inventories, etc. Overall, the problem of the misuse of 
investment recommendations and price manipulation could be more severe in emerging 
markets.  
Existing literature on the effect of investment recommendations in the context of 
emerging markets is very limited and, likely due to the lack of regulatory data, tend to 
analyze interactions between analyst recommendations and price change.  Moshirian, 
Ng, and Wu (2009), in their sample of 13 emerging countries, show that stock prices 
react strongly to stock analyst recommendations. They also report a stronger positive 
bias in analyst recommendations and revisions in emerging markets than in developed 
markets. Similarly, Kiymaz (2002) analyzed the effects of stock market rumors related 
to information release at the Istanbul Stock Exchange. He found that positive and 
significant abnormal returns are observed in the days prior to the publication date and 
that negative yet insignificant returns are observed in the post-publication period. This 
supports our view of emerging markets, especially the possible existence of information 
leak and/or strategic trading around the time when recommendations are released. 
Even in developed markets, however, interaction between institutional trading 
and released recommendations is observed.  Irvine et al. (2007), for example, analyzed 
the behavior of institutional traders immediately before the release of analysts’ initial 
                                                                                                                                               
regulations are criticized for being too restrictive and likely to reduce the quality and quantity of 
information available to retail investors (Fisch, 2006). 
3 See e.g., Hanousek and Filer (2002) or Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2007). 
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buy recommendations. They find very high institutional trading volume and buying 
beginning five days before buy recommendations are publicly released and typically 
before the trading based on such recommendations earns an abnormal profit. Therefore 
in our analysis we consider five- and ten-day windows around the release of each 
recommendation. 
Even on regulated markets a relationship exists between associated analysts’ 
recommendations.  Kadan et al. (2009), for instance, demonstrate that affiliated analysts 
are still reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations, while other literature 
consistently shows that analysts tend to over-recommend buying the stocks of firms 
with which they are affiliated (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; 
Barber and Trueman, 2007). This can be explained by the desire of analysts to generate 
trading commissions, which is supported by the findings of Ertimur et al. (2007) who 
show a correlation between the type of recommendation, profitability, the accuracy of 
forecasts, and conflict of interest arising from banking activity.  
In this study we use data from the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) to demonstrate 
our methodology. The PSE represents a typical electronic dealers’ market, in which 
market makers play a dominant role in affecting the price for a short time interval as 
well as for a longer period (see Hanousek and Kopriva, 2011). Although capital market 
regulation has improved in line with EU legislation, differences between the regulation 
of the Czech capital market and the regulation of a developed market such as the NYSE 
or the LSE are still significant.4 Brokers on the Czech capital market have enough 
market power to influence stock prices for a short time period and, similar to other 
emerging markets, they can be involved in dual trading – the practice of submitting 
customer orders and simultaneously trading as dealers on their own account. Further, 
the lack of regulation of investment recommendations, as well as no requirement for the 
separation of brokerage and investment banking activities, implies that the Czech 
Republic still has many features that exacerbate problems related to investment 
recommendations.    
                                                 
4 While the Prague Stock Exchange started operation in 1993, the Czech Securities Commission 
commenced operation in April 1998. The role of the Czech Securities Commission was to strengthen 
investor and investment instruments issuer trust in the capital market.  As of April 2006 the Czech 




2.3  METHODOLOGY – USING STOCK QUOTES TO ANALYZE BROKERS’ 
BEHAVIOR  
Our aim is to capture and analyze brokers' trading behavior, focusing on the dates 
around which associated analysts issue investment recommendations. Recently, several 
trading platforms have enabled participants to see real time quotes/positions of each 
active broker/market maker, meaning there exist high-frequency trading data for each 
broker.5  
In general, brokers’ trading positions are well-described by their buy/sell 
statistics and by their positions on the bid and ask sides. In our analysis, we omit all 
cross trades, mainly because of their different nature (for example, some are used to set 
up standard operations such as the leveraged trading of a broker’s client) and we 
consider only mandatory trades.6 For capturing and summarizing a broker’s position on 
a bid or ask we use the relative distance from the best quotes and average the rank on 
the bid or ask. Since the original trading data are collected at a high frequency, for daily 
versions we need to compute the time-weighted averages of these variables. 
Methodologically, in our analysis we follow three key steps: (1) Construct 
statistics that summarize the daily behavior of a given broker from publicly available 
high-frequency data; (2) use these statistics as dependent variables in seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) with information about the timing and direction of 
investment recommendations used as a regressor; (3) assess  the differences in trading 
behavior of brokers before and after their own recommendations as well as the 
differences in reacting to one’s own as opposed to external recommendations. 
In the first step, we summarize brokers’ trading behavior at a daily frequency in 
the following variables (computed for each share): 
a) Buyj,t = total number of mandatory buys (in lots) by each broker j on trading day t.  
b) Sellj,t = total number of mandatory sells (in lots) by each broker j on trading day t. 
c) Time-weighted percentage difference from the best bid, computed for broker j on 
trading day t: 
                                                 
5 The availability of such data varies across markets and trading platforms. 




First, we compute the percentage difference of every bid that broker j makes on 
trading day t from the corresponding best bid as 
,  	,
		  100 .        (2.1) 
We then weight it by the time interval for which this distance holds during the 
trading day; i.e. the final daily statistics is the time-weighted average of (2.1) 
collapsed to daily frequency. 
d) Time-weighted percentage difference from the best ask, computed for each broker j 
on trading day t: 
,  ,
  100 .        (2.2) 
As in c) we collapse intra-day data to the daily level using time-weights representing 
the duration of a particular position in (2.2). 
Analogously, for robustness we also consider the average ranks of the bid and ask. 
e) Time-weighted daily average rank on the bid of broker j, where we compute the rank 
of broker j on the bid side at a particular time, and then again weight it by the time 
interval for which this rank holds. As for the other statistics, the final value is the time-
weighted average rank of broker j, representing his average position on the bid during 
the trading day. 
f) Time-weighted daily average rank on the ask of broker j, the same as in e) but 
computed for ask positions.  
The variables defined in a) through f) above not only reflect the trading behavior of a 
particular broker but also allow for comparison with the behavior of other brokers. We 
are not only interested in the change of  behavior of an individual broker before and 
after a particular recommendation is issued, but also in whether his change of behavior 
is notably different from the behavior of other brokers on the market. 
Since we know the exact timing of each recommendation, we can link them with 
brokers’ trading behavior and analyze the differences around the releases of the 
recommendations. The reaction to a particular recommendation differs depending on 
whether it is a positive (BUY) or negative (SELL) recommendation and on how the 
particular recommendation compares with the previous recommendation. Therefore, for 
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each broker we define several 0/1 indicators (dummy variables) defining a 
neighborhood of k trading days before and after the release of the recommendation by 
associated analysts. The choice of k trading days allows us to see whether there is a 
reaction and, if so, how long it lasts (as a baseline we use k = 5 and 10, but we also 
consider k = 15 and asymmetric windows for robustness checks).  
Let us define for each broker j and recommendation type r the following 0/1 
indicators (dummy variables): 
	,  
1  for k trading days before  release of recommendation of 
 broker
0    otherwise                                                                                                                                      
    
(2.3) 
!,  
1  for k trading days after  release of recommendation of 
 broker   
0    otherwise                                                                                                                                     
 , 
 
where r represents any possible recommendation: positive, negative, positive change, or 
negative change.7  
Because each broker could react to any investment advice known to the market, 
we should also consider the effects of recommendations issued by other brokers. 
Therefore, as in (3.3) we define dummy variables capturing the neighborhoods of the 




 1  for k trading days before  another broker's recommendation release0    otherwise                                                                                                                                     
   
    (2.4) 
!,  
1  for k trading days #$%& another broker's recommendation release  0    otherwise                                                                                                                                    
 . 
  
Finally, in order to capture the effect of recommendations coming from external 
financial analysts (i.e. analysts not associated with any brokers operating on the stock 
market), we define   
      
	  
1  for k trading days before  release of external analyst(s recommendation0    otherwise                                                                                                                                               
  
 (2.5) 
                                                 
7 A positive change means a change from a negative (SELL) recommendation to a neutral (HOLD) or 
positive (BUY) recommendation. A negative change means a change from a positive (BUY) 








To analyze the effect of investment recommendations on the trading behavior of broker 
j let us consider the following specification: 
$&#)*+,  - . 
/ 012,  . 34,  . 52,  . 64,  . 72  
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where the variable trading stands for all trading proxies defined in a) through f), i.e. the 
number of buys and sells; the percentage difference from the best bid and ask; and the 
average rank of the bid and ask. As mentioned above, as baselines we use time windows 
of five and ten trading days. Therefore, the dummy variables 2, , 2, , and 2   
are equal to one for ten trading days before the particular recommendation has been 
released.8 Similarly, 4, , 4, , and 4   are equal to one for ten trading days after 
the particular recommendation was made public. 
 Subscript j is used to designate each broker, subscript t marks the trading day, 
and superscript r denotes the type of recommendation. - represents the mean of the 
analyzed trading variable for broker j. The coefficients 3, 1, 5 ,  6  7, and 8 capture 
systematic effects before and after the release of  recommendations made by each type 
of analyst. In particular, our main coefficients of interest 1 and 3 measure systematic 
shifts in the trading patterns of broker j before and after the release of investment 
recommendations issued by associated analysts. The other variables in specification 
(2.6) are included to filter a possible overlap in the timing of recommendations as well 
as to control for the reactions of broker j to other investment advice. 
 As specified in (2.6), we analyze the trading patterns by regressing each 
particular trading variable on a set of dummies representing the timing of all types of 
                                                 
8 We keep the notation as it is above, where the subscript own is used when the broker posted the 
recommendation, the subscript other is used when at least one of the other brokers posted the 
recommendation, and the subscript outside is used when an external analyst posted the recommendation. 
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recommendation issued by all kinds of analyst. One potential problem, however, is that 
while the analysis of trading data could point to interactions between associated analysts 
and brokers, it might not detect which came first. If a broker's trading was primarily 
based on previous knowledge of an associated analyst’s recommendation (more likely) 
or if the recommendation was released in order to maintain the broker’s inventories 
(less likely), there could be an endogeneity problem related to the timing of the 
recommendation. If we could take the timing of the recommendation as given (that is, if 
it was decided by the analysts) then the right-hand-side dummy variables would be pre-
determined and the estimated coefficients would be unbiased. Clearly, if the error term 
and explanatory variables are correlated then the estimation procedure would lead to 
biased coefficients. Nonetheless, we believe that our estimation provides consistent 
estimates. First, as indicated in the literature (e.g. Irvine et al., 2007) the analyst’s 
recommendation takes some time and typically starts with a potential information leak. 
Second, we conducted estimation (2.6) over different time windows; the similarity of 
results shows there to be consistency of the estimated coefficients. 
 For estimating the empirical specification we employ a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) setup, where for a given share we estimate equations for all brokers 
j =1,..,J together. This approach provides more efficient estimates of the parameters of 
interest by using cross-equation correlations caused by, e.g., common exogenous shocks 
affecting all brokers such as a change in market trends. Since we estimate specification 
(2.6) over the whole sample period, we control for interference between various 
recommendations (released at a similar time) and for heterogeneous shocks affecting the 
behavior of all brokers.   
2.4  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
For our analysis, we use information on all investment recommendations during the 
period 2003–2008, which are publicly available online at www.ipoint.cz, together with 
high-frequency data about broker activity on the SPAD trading system of the PSE, also 
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publicly available online at www.akcie.cz.9 In the analysis we only use data on blue 
chip stocks, i.e. shares from the top-tier trading segment.  
The high-frequency trading data consists of all SPAD trades and all SPAD 
quotes with the identification of brokers/market makers for all stocks traded during the 
time span 10 February 2004 to 31 December 2008. The dataset of SPAD trades consists 
of  the stock ID, date and time, number of shares traded, price, traded volume, type of 
trade, and indicator of a mandatory sell or buy (when the broker’s quote was the best 
bid price or best sell price), including the identification of the broker. The dataset of 
SPAD quotes consists of the stock ID, date and time, bid and ask prices, bid and ask 
volumes, and identification of the broker. 
Analysts in the Czech Republic produce most investment recommendations in 
the form of buy and sell recommendations together with target prices (one year ahead).  
Most publish their recommendations regularly, covering nearly all the blue chip stocks. 
As the wording of recommendations and their scales vary considerably, to simplify the 
analysis we merge recommendations into three main categories: sell, hold, and buy 
(negative, neutral, and positive in our terms). Even though the I/B/E/S10 uses five 
categories ranging from strong sell to strong buy, given the actual structure of 
recommendations, three categories is more appropriate for model identification. 
The dataset of investment recommendations consists of the date, identification 
of the stock, issuer of the recommendation, target price, and recommendation (buy, sell, 
or hold). For some recommendations an additional description of the previous 
recommendation of the same issuer is included. We dropped all investment 
recommendations before 10 February 2004 as we do not have any quote data for this 
time interval. This left us with 1317 investment recommendations for stocks traded in 
SPAD that contained information on the type of recommendation. We matched the 
recommendation to the standard scale: buy, hold and sell. Detailed information on the 
                                                 
9 www.ipoint.cz is an internet site owned by CEKIA (Czech Capital Information Agency) that provides 
detailed monitoring of press releases, investment recommendations, and analyst views associated with the 
PSE. www.akcie.cz is an internet site offering high-frequency trading data in real time with a delay of 15 
minutes. 
10 The Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) is a unique service which monitors the earnings 
estimates of companies of interest to institutional investors. 
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basic characteristics of the shares studied, including the number of quotes and 
investment recommendations released, is presented in Table 2.1 (in the appendix). 
Further, we divided the investment recommendations by the type of issuer: 
1) investment firms that also act as brokers on the PSE (11 firms); and 2) all other 
external investment analysts/firms who posted at least one investment recommendation 
during the analyzed time span. 
Since the open phase of the SPAD system runs each trading day from 9:15 a.m. 
to 4:00 p.m. we include in the analysis only quotes and trades during this time interval. 
As described in the methodology section, we use high-frequency intra-day data on the 
quotes and trades of brokers to create a proposed battery of trading variables, namely 
the number of mandatory buys and sells during a trading day, to the time-weighted 
average from intra-day data about rank on the bid and ask side or the percentage 
difference from best quotes.  We then match brokers' trading data with the dates and 
information on investment recommendations. For the sensitivity analysis, we analyze 
time windows running from 5 to 15 trading days around each recommendation; the 
main results will be presented for 5 and 10 trading-day windows. 
2.5  RESULTS 
The main goal of this study is to determine whether brokers on the stock market misuse 
the potential informational advantage stemming from their association with analysts. 
This misuse could manifest in behavior different from other market participants. 
Although individual patterns of significance and the direction of the coefficients for 
each stock and broker pair may be interesting from a regulatory point of view, we 
examine these patterns more comprehensively to get a broader view.  During the studied 
period the PSE was generally on an upside trend, so we present here only the results for 
positive recommendations.  
Table 2.2 (in the appendix) provides a general summary of the occurrence of all  
possible combinations of behavior before and after the release of recommendations by 
associated analysts, measured by the occurrence of positive/negative/insignificant 
coefficients for the respective dummy variables. The numbers are summarized over all 
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broker-share pairs for six trading behavior proxies.11 By interpreting the systematic 
patterns in Table 2.2, we can answer questions regarding the existence of informational 
advantage and how it was used. 
1. Is the timing of recommendations unknown to associated brokers? 
This question can be addressed by ascertaining whether the estimated coefficients 1>  
(i.e., a systematic shift before the release of one’s own recommendations) are 
significantly different from zero.  For the 10-day window we see significant coefficients 
in about 28% of the cases for rank positions, 32% of the buy/sell measures, and about 
42% of the quotes. For the 5-day window the results are even stronger. We observe 
significant coefficients in about 30% of the cases for rank positions, 36% of the buy/sell 
measures and about 44% of the quotes.12  The evidence thus suggests that brokers either 
know about the timing of the recommendation, or recommendations were issued upon 
their request. From the trading data we cannot distinguish the direction of the causality, 
but the significant coefficients before the release of recommendations indicate 
interactions between brokers and associated analysts. Let us note that the high number 
of cases (broker and share) where we see systematic non-zero responses before the 
release of one’s own recommendation also indicates an information leak and can be 
used as an additional indicator of conflict of interest.       
2. Is broker trading behavior (around the time of the investment recommendation) 
consistent with the recommendation issued by associated brokers? 
In order to answer this question, we first analyze the expected signs of the estimated 
coefficients for positive recommendations. 
• Ask difference, Ask rank, and Sell. If a positive recommendation resonates with 
a broker’s view or if there is a positive effect of the recommendation in question, 
then we should expect the broker to be less active on the sell side, especially 
                                                 
11 There are 165 possible broker-share pairs (11 brokers x 15 shares). However, there are only 119 pairs in 
which analysts associated with the broker actually issued at least one recommendation concerning a 
particular stock. 
12 To be precise, for the 10-day window we obtain the following numbers. For rank bid and ask it is 
29.4% and 26.1%, for buy and sell it is 30.3% and 33.1%,  and for bid and ask difference it is 44.5% and 
40.3%, respectively. For the 5-day window we obtain the following ratios. For rank bid and ask it is  29% 




after the recommendation is released. We should see a smaller distance from the 
best ask offer (frontier), i.e. the coefficient on the dummy variable “After” is 
expected to be negative when Ask Difference is used as a measure of trading 
activity. Similarly, Ask Rank should be smaller (negative coefficient); the 
coefficients when using (mandatory) Sell should also be negative.  
• Bid difference, Bid rank, and Buy. Similarly, the bid behavior of the broker 
should reflect an opposite reaction to positive or negative recommendations 
compared to the ask case discussed above.  If the broker sends a “true” positive 
signal, he should not buy the particular stock more actively, or at least should be 
more positive on the offer side compared to the no recommendation period and 
to the behavior of other brokers on the market. 
Based on the expected reaction to the investment recommendation, for each trading 
variable13 we can classify cases in which the broker systematically trades a) in line with 
the recommendation (or no reaction); or b) against the recommendation. 
• Buy (Bid difference, Bid rank) variable used as a proxy 
a.  Consistent: Consistent or no reaction behavior is  formed by the 
following combinations of before/after coefficients. 
• negative before, insignificant or positive after 
• insignificant before, positive after 
• positive before, positive after 
• insignificant before, insignificant after. 
b. Inconsistent: Trading patterns that do not resonate with the released 
recommendation are characterized by the following combinations. 
• positive before, insignificant or negative after 
• insignificant before, negative after 
• negative before, negative after. 
• Sell (Ask difference, Ask rank) variable used as a proxy 
a. Consistent combinations 
                                                 
13 One could argue that results for the number of buys and sells should reflect a much stronger broker 
reaction regarding his own and others’ recommendations. However, we expect to get similar answers, 
regardless of the trading proxy used. 
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• positive before, insignificant or negative after 
• insignificant before, negative after 
• negative before, negative after 
• insignificant before, insignificant after. 
b. Inconsistent combinations 
• negative before, insignificant or positive after 
• insignificant before, positive after 
• positive before, positive after. 
Table 2.3 (in the appendix) summarizes the consistent and inconsistent trading behavior 
of all brokers using a detailed combination of the possible outcomes presented in Table 
2.2. 
From Table 2.3 it seems clear that the inconsistency between investment 
recommendations and brokers’ trading patterns is not just a coincidence. Very similar 
results are obtained for both time windows. As the inconsistent combinations indicate a 
recurring misuse of informational advantage stemming from affiliated analyst 
recommendations, Table 2.3 demonstrates how the broker’s behavior systematically 
contradicts his recommendations across various stock groups and trading proxies. The 
percentages in Table 2.3 are computed from the aggregated numbers of all brokers. 
Therefore, they aggregate all brokers – those who do not use informational advantage 
and those that do. Clearly, the share of those cases in which we see systematic trading 
patterns that are inconsistent with the just-released recommendation is well above a 
Type I error; it is not random. Moreover, a very similar pattern occurs across all the 
variables used and the various type of stocks traded. However, local large companies 
exhibit slightly larger percentages compared to cross-listed companies. This may result 
from the fact that information leaks are easier when the company is listed on two or 
more markets and the investment recommendation is available to a larger number of 
subjects. Such leaks may provide the other local brokers with an opportunity to react to 
possible informational advantage, just as the affiliated brokers respond to their own 
recommendation.  
 The overall trading pattern shows that trading activity and the release of 
investment recommendations are not orthogonal; moreover, the observed figures 
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support the statement that investment recommendations and their timing are either used 
to balance the broker’s inventories, or prior information about the released advice is 
used to make a short-term profit for proprietary trading. It is possible to conclude, 
therefore, that this segment of brokerage activity in the Czech Republic calls for 
additional regulation.  
2.6  CONCLUSION 
In this study we propose an innovative approach to testing the potential conflict of 
interest between analysts and traders, specifically the potential misuse of investment 
recommendations. In contrast to mainstream research associated with investment 
recommendations, we do not analyze the behavior of analysts, nor do we estimate their 
forecast error or test if they behave strategically. Instead, we take their investment 
recommendations as given, including the timing, and analyze the behavior of associated 
brokers around the time of the release of a recommendation.  
  The difference in our approach also lies in the use of different data sources.  
Rather than employing data from regulatory authorities, as other studies do, we rely on 
high-frequency data from internet-based trading platforms that allow us to identify the 
intra-day behavior of large brokers (market makers). We define time-weighted variables 
that profile a broker’s daily trading pattern, including his position on the bid and ask 
sides. The comprehensive information contained in trading proxies is used to analyze 
whether a broker’s behavior differs before and after a particular investment 
recommendation is released. Basically, if we observe systematic patterns across a long 
period of time, then we observe the manipulation or misuse of investment advice. We 
control for the effects of other investment recommendations and estimate the 
specification via a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework for efficiency 
gains. 
 Although we may lack some information that is available only in confidential 
regulatory datasets, our results suggest that collapsed high-frequency trading data 
contains sufficient information to detect the suspicious behavior of a particular broker. 
Since our trading data is generated from a trading platform that is used primarily by 
retail and small investors, we cannot fully analyze the broker's interactions with large 
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and institutional investors, which are usually done off the market. Our study is, 
however, better at capturing the misuse of the investment advice of large brokers over 
retail investors (or the informational advantage associated with such advice), which is a 
primary concern of regulators. 
 Our approach is demonstrated on trading data from the Prague Stock Exchange. 
Results confirm that on this market the above-mentioned conflict of interest exists and 
is quite severe. Assuming that this result can be generalized to all emerging stock 
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2.8 APPENDIX  
Table 2.1: Number of quotes, trading days and investment recommendations 
Name 

















O2 1233 7-10 560 17.20 85 63 61% 
CRA 188 2-8 95 1.57 7 1 50% 
CEZ 1233 8-10 1168 53.50 114 93 69% 
UNI 1233 4-8 371 6.10 65 11 37% 
PM 1233 4-8 241 2.67 52 5 35% 
EB 1234 6-9 687 12.20 78 149 66% 
ZEN 1141 7-9 464 13.50 100 57 56% 
ORCO 986 6-8 329 3.78 46 21 76% 
CME 884 5-6 282 4.27 62 60 66% 
ECM 517 3-7 245 2.33 15 3 72% 
PN 510 3-8 251 2.23 26 2 79% 
AAA 318 2-7 118 0.18 17 3 15% 
VIG 229 4-5 148 0.44 6 22 75% 
NWR 166 6-7 819 14.60 13 18 74% 
KB  1232 6-10 786 21.10 70 53 49% 
Total         756 561   
Notes: Recommendations include all types of recommendations: sell, hold, and buy. 





Table 2.2: Summary of results for all brokers and all blue chip stocks 
    
Panel A. Positive recommendation, time window 5 days before and after release 
 









  Negative 3 2 13 8 6 4 
Negative Insignificant 3 7 10 9 13 9 
  Positive 2 1 3 2 0 0 
  Negative 11 5 10 7 7 7 
Insignificant Insignificant 68 66 65 68 75 78 
  Positive 9 13 5 5 5 3 
  Negative 3 2 1 1 2 4 
Positive Insignificant 16 12 4 11 7 6 
  Positive 4 10 8 8 4 8 
 
 
Panel B. Positive recommendation, time window 10 days before and after release 
 









  Negative 6 3 22 20 9 6 
Negative Insignificant 4 9 10 7 11 10 
  Positive 1 5 4 3 2 2 
  Negative 8 4 11 10 10 6 
Insignificant Insignificant 63 59 50 52 70 72 
  Positive 11 8 4 6 5 4 
  Negative 3 7 3 2 3 3 
Positive Insignificant 16 11 6 12 3 6 
  Positive 7 12 9 7 6 10 
 
Note: The table contains all the possible combinations of outcomes for brokers' reactions to their own 
recommendations. Note that each case here represents a coefficient in specification (6), not a particular 
release of a recommendation. The reading of the table is illustrated thus: For example,  in Panel B, 
number 6 in the upper left cell means that when the variable Buy (the number of shares bought as 
mandatory) was used as a proxy for trading behavior, overall we see 6 cases (brokers and stocks) when 
both coefficients before and after the release of recommendations were negative. Similarly, the 
combination positive before, positive after (the variable Ask difference) in the left column at the bottom of 
the table means that in 7 cases (stocks and brokers) we see a systematic positive response before and  
positive response after the recommendation was released. Again, we define the neighborhood of the 
recommendation as 10 trading days before and 10 trading days after, using the full model specification 
(6). Results for the other time (including asymmetric) windows are not presented here, but are available 






Table 2.3: Broker’s behavior systematically against his recommendation – 
sensitivity analysis, across various share groups and trading indicators (positive 






Bid and ask 
difference 
Bid and ask 
rank 
All 15 companies 
5 days 27% 22% 48% 
10 days 28% 27% 21% 
Local large companies 
5 days 34% 26% 19% 
10 days 30% 32% 29% 
Cross-listed companies 
 
5 days 23% 21% 13% 
10 days 33% 27% 15% 
 
Note: The table contains a simple counting of each broker and stock of trading patterns, which are in line 
with or against the broker’s own recommendation. The summary is based on the significance of the 
coefficients in specification (6). Below each behavioral proxy we present a ratio of all cases (broker and 
stock) in which we see the broker’s behavior systematically contradicting his recommendations. The 
group of local large companies consists of O2, CEZ, UNI, PM, Zentiva, and KB. Cross-listed companies 
are represented by CME, EB, ORCO and NWR. 
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Testing Expected Utility Theory  












I analyze the risk preferences of bettors using data from the world’s largest betting exchange, Betfair. The 
assumption of a constant bet size, commonly used in the current literature, leads to an unrealistic model of 
bettors’ decision making as a choice between a high return - low variance and low return - high variance 
bet, automatically implying risk-loving preferences of bettors. However, the data show that bettors bet 
different amounts on different odds. Thus, simply by introducing the computed average bet size at given 
odds I transform the bettor's decision problem into a standard choice between low return - low variance 
and high return - high variance bets, and I am able to correctly estimate the risk attitudes of bettors. 
Results indicate that bettors on Betfair are either risk neutral (tennis and soccer markets) or slightly risk 
loving (horse racing market). I further use the information on the average bet size to test the validity of 
EUT.  The results suggest that, when facing a number of outcomes with different winning probabilities, 
bettors tend to overweight small and underweight large differences in probabilities, which is in direct 
contradiction to the linear probability weighting function implied by EUT. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Expected utility theory (EUT) is considered to be one of the keystones of modern 
economic theory, yet its validity has been challenged by a large number of studies. The 
most prominent critique of EUT concerns the assumption that probability enters into 
people’s preferences over lotteries linearly. As pointed out by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992), the impact of the probability on the preferences over lotteries also depends on 
its distance from the so-called reference points – certainty and impossibility. This notion 
became the building block of behavioral theories1 of decision making under risk and 
uncertainty, and led to the introduction of non-linear probability weighting functions. 
A number of experiments document that behavioral theories are able to explain 
decision making under risk and uncertainty remarkably better than can EUT. There are, 
however, few empirical studies which assess the validity either of EUT or of behavioral 
theories in real situations. An innovative strand of empirical literature on this topic 
analyzes price data (odds) from betting markets.2 These papers  generally try to explain 
the existence of favorite–long shot bias3, where bets on low probability outcome of 
events  have a lower expected return  than bets on high probability outcomes; an 
observation which is not consistent with standard EUT under the classic risk-averse 
utility function assumption. To explain this inconsistency, two lines of argument have 
been used – either positing a risk-loving utility function under EUT, or introducing 
probability weighting functions in behavioral theories (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010). 
The main drawback of previous studies on betting markets is, however, the 
absence of data on bet size. With the exception of Bradley (2003), they all posit an 
implicit assumption that bettors place the same amount of money on outcomes with 
different odds (i.e. that the bet size is constant irrespective of the probability of the 
outcome). As discussed in the next section, if we allow bettors to bet different amounts 
on outcomes with different odds, their decision problem is transformed into a standard 
choice between low return – low variance and high return – high variance bets. Thus, 
                                                 
1 See for example Tversky and Kahneman (1992) - Cumulative prospect theory (CPT); and Quiggin 
(1982) - Rank-dependent expected utility theory (RDEU). 
2 Weitzman (1965), Ali (1977), Kanto et al. (1992), Hamid et al. (1996), Golec and Tamarkin (1998), 
Jullien and Salanie (2000), Bradley (2003), Gandhi (2007), Snowberg and Wolfers  (2010). 
3 Favorite-long shot bias is one of the most prominent empirical regularities observed on betting data and 
was first noted by Griffith (1949) in horse racing betting markets. 
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the existence of long shot bias can be consistent with the standard risk-averse utility 
function under EUT, and need not resort to behavioral theories for explanation. 
I design   a novel empirical test to assess the validity of EUT vs. behavioral 
theories using information on how much bettors bet on different outcomes of a 
particular event. Further, applying data from the world’s largest betting exchange, 
Betfair, to a wide range of events (tennis, soccer and horse races) for which outcomes 
span the whole range of winning probabilities allows me to analyze decision under risk 
and uncertainty under various scenarios. I draw conditioned subsamples based on the 
occurrence of a favorite in the event (i.e. event with/without a clear favorite),4 using 
odds as a proxy for the objective probabilities of winning. These subsamples, and 
particularly the ratio of bets on different outcomes among events, provide rich 
information to test whether bettors weight probabilities linearly. As the conditioned 
subsamples fundamentally differ in their probability ranges of outcomes, finding 
substantial differences in how bettors assess the probabilities and determine the ratio of 
bet sizes on different outcomes in these conditioned subsamples strictly contradicts the 
linear probability weighting function assumption in EUT. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 analyzes the implications of the 
constant bet size assumption; section 3.3 outlines the methodology and estimation 
strategy. The data description is provided in section 3.4, section 3.5 presents and 
discusses the results and section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 CONSTANT BET SIZE ASSUMPTION 
In recent years, the emergence of literature that analyzes the behavior of bettors on 
betting markets has fostered great progress in the understanding of decision making 
under risk and uncertainty. Early studies analyzing the risk preferences of bettors treat 
all events (races) as identical, group them by different characteristics, e.g. by odds 
intervals or position of horse in the race (see for example Ali, 1977 and Kanto et al., 
1992), and  conduct their analysis on the aggregated values. A further advance in the 
field was introduced by Jullien and Salanie (2000) who design a new methodology 
                                                 
4 Conditioning on  races with high-probability winning horses was used first by Golec and Tamarkin 
(1998) to address the problem of racetrack betting data, which consist of  relatively few favorites (high-
probability results) compared to the number of underdogs. 
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which does not require aggregation because, as they argue,  betting behavior may differ 
with different characteristics of the particular horse race event. Given the limited 
availability of data, however, these papers all rely on the assumption of a representative 
bettor and constant bet size, i.e. they estimate the preferences of an average or marginal 
bettor who is indifferent among betting the same amount on different outcomes of a 
particular event. Ghandi (2007) relaxed this assumption by assuming a pool of 
heterogeneous agents that differ in their preferences over the horses. Effectively, 
however, he estimates the behavior of several marginal bettors who are indifferent 
between betting on two outcomes instead of betting on all outcomes. 
The underlying assumption of the previous studies implies that, under EUT, a 
marginal bettor facing an event with two outcomes is indifferent between betting on the 
favorite or on the underdog. Assume a horse race with just two horses, one favorite with 
probability of winning ?* and decimal odds5 @* , and one underdog with probability ?+ 
A?+  1 B ?*C and odds @+, where ?+ D ?* and @+ E @*. The marginal bettor bets 
constant amount  (i.e., bet size is constant). Then, the marginal bettor is indifferent 
between betting on the favorite vs. betting on the underdog if and only if 
FG*  ?*HAI . A@* B 1CC . A1 B ?*CHAI B C
 HAI . A@+ B 1CC . A1 B ?+CHAI B C  FG+ 
    (3.1) 
?*HJI . J@& B 1KK B ?+HAI . A@+ B 1CC  A?*B?+CHAI B C 
In the presence of long shot bias the return on favorite is higher than return on 
underdog: 
?*AI . A@* B 1CC . A1 B ?*CAI B C
E ?+AI . A@+ B 1CC . A1B?+CAI B C 
(3.2) 
?*AI . A@* B 1CC B ?+AI . A@+ B 1CC E A?*B?+CAI B C 
 
 
                                                 
5 Bookmakers in Europe, the UK and the US have different standards of displaying odds. Further in the 
text I use the European style of odds, also called decimal odds. Odds   1.40 imply that the bet will 
bring payoff   1	
  0.40
 if the outcome wins and 
 if the outcome loses. In the UK odds are 
usually displayed in the form 	
  /  2/5  . .     	/. In the US odds are displayed in 
the form +X or –X where the negative odds are for those bets where the payoff is lower than the bet. In 
our case the US odds are 	    250 ;   1  100/ if the US odds are negative and  
  1  /100 if the US odds are positive. 
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Without loss of generality we can assume that I B   0 and HA0C  0. Thus, 
HAI . A@+ B 1CC
HAI . A@* B 1CC 
?*
?+ E
I . A@+ B 1C
I . A@* B 1C   
(3.3) 
As I . A@+ B 1C E  I . A@* B 1C, the utility function has to be convex at least in 
some range of the interval AI . A@* B 1C, I . A@+ B 1CC  – i.e., the marginal bettor 
has to exhibit risk-loving preferences. 
Following the same line of thought, Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) point out 
that, in the presence of long shot bias and without assuming non-linear probability 
weighting function, one has to allow for the risk-loving preferences of a marginal bettor 
under EUT. They recognize that using information on price data (odds) alone for simple 
bets (e.g., bet on the winner of a horse race) is not sufficient to confirm the validity of 
EUT vs. behavioral theories. Instead, they compare the price data on simple bets – win 
bets and compound bets – exactas, trifectas and quinellas (exotic bets on the order of the 
first two or three horses and on the two horses to come first in the race in either order) 
and  find evidence in favor of  behavioral theories. Therefore, they conclude that the 
long shot bias is mainly driven by the misperception of probabilities rather than by the 
risk-loving preferences of rational bettors. 
Nevertheless, these previous studies lack important information, namely how 
much people bet on different outcomes with different winning probabilities. The only 
study to account for bet size in the analysis of bettors’ behavior is Bradley (2003). As he 
does not have data on bet size, he performs his analysis using the imputed optimal bet 
size of a representative bettor. By assuming that the only utility that a bettor has from a 
bet is derived from expected return and variance, he computes the optimal bet as an 
argument for the maximum weighted expected utility given the probabilities and odds. 
However, he still does not consider the main reason for including bet size, namely how 
it changes the estimates of the revealed risk preferences of the marginal bettor. If one 
allows the marginal bettor to bet amount * on the favorite and + on the underdog, the 
above stated key formula for identification of his risk preferences changes to 
FG*  ?*HAI . A@* B 1C*C . A1 B ?*CHAI B *C






Let me define for the further analysis the following function 
LAM, * , +, ?* , ?+, @* , @+, IC  FG* B FG+ (3.5) 
where M represents the risk preference parameter of the utility function. Contrary to the 
previous case, conditional on the ratio of the average bet sizes on the two outcomes, 
equation (3.4) may have none, one, or two solutions under standard utility assumptions. 
Henceforward, all examples are done under EUT with the standard CARA utility 
function assumption HAN, MC  J1 B %
, .K M⁄ , where M E 0 corresponds to risk-averse 
preferences.6  
In the first step, I focus on the analysis of the fair odds case (i.e., no long shot 
bias present). Under EUT the risk-neutral bettor should be willing to bet any amount of 
money, which is unrealistic. Therefore, it is more reasonable to define a risk-neutral 
bettor in terms of the bet size ratio as the limit case between a risk-loving and risk-
averse bettor (see Figure 3.1 below).  
Figure 3.1: Bet size ratio with fair odds 
   
 
Note: The figure depicts the difference of expected utility of betting on the favorite and betting on the 
underdog under fair odds with the bet size on the favorite on the horizontal axis, for different risk aversity 
parameters θ of the CARA utility function. The difference is illustrated on an example, where the 
probability of the favorite winning is 90% and the probability of the underdog winning  is 10%. The 
arrows illustrate the shift towards less risk-averse values of parameter θ. 
 
Mathematically, the risk-neutral bettor would choose, under fair odds, the ratio: 
 * +⁄  lim,/0A*/+ QHRS $S#$ LAM, * , + , … C  0C, with solution 




                                                 
6 One would get similar results  with the standard CRRA utility function , 	  N12 1  	  




2 Risk neutral ratio
q < 0 - risk loving
q = 0 - risk neutral
q > 0 - risk averse























In the case with two outcomes, the previous expression boils down to 
* +⁄  ?* ?+ #Q ?* . ?+  1⁄  
In the example depicted in Figure 3.1, this corresponds to the *  90 (bet ratio 9:1). 
This analysis can be used to derive the risk preferences of the bettor from the ratio of 
bets that I would observe in the data without long shot bias. In Figure 3.2, I distinguish 
two possible cases of bet ratios * +⁄ :  1.) * +⁄ X 1: This case corresponds to the 
constant bet size assumption (thick line in  Figure 3.2). In this case, the equation (REF) 
has one closed solution in M  0 and one limit solution for M Y ∞. However, the above 
analysis implies that the ratio of those bets consistent with the behavior of a risk-neutral 
bettor is definitely higher than 1. Thus, I pick the limit solution M Y ∞ as the correct 
one and interpret the risk preferences of the marginal bettor who bets constant amounts 
on both outcomes as extremely risk averse.7  
Figure 3.2: Eliciting risk preferences from bet size ratio under fair odds 
Note: The figure depicts the difference of expected utility of betting on the favorite and betting on the 
underdog under fair odds with the risk aversity parameter θ of the CARA utility function on the 
horizontal axis, given the bet size on the favorite and on the underdog. The difference is illustrated on an 
example, where the probability of the favorite winning is 90%, and the probability of the underdog 
winning is 10%. 
                                                 
7 This behavior may also be interpreted as a decision to bet a certain amount of money but an 
unwillingness to bet/lose any more money than that. Such behavior will be more consistent with immense 
risk-averse preferences than with risk neutral preferences.  







Betting $100 on favorite and $10 on underdog
Betting $90 on favorite and $10 on underdog
Betting $70 on favorite and $10 on underdog
Constant bet size of $10























2.) * +⁄ E 1: In line with the previous argument, the risk preferences continuously 
shift from extremely risk averse to extremely risk loving.  Based on the bet size ratio we 
can distinguish two cases:  if the bet size ratio is lower than the ratio chosen by the risk-
neutral bettor, then the marginal bettor is risk averse (Figure 3.2, dashed line); whereas 
if the bet size ratio is higher, we can infer that the marginal bettor has risk-loving 
preferences (Figure 3.2, dot-and-dashed line), with a risk-neutral ratio of bets between 
them (Figure 3.2, thin line).  
In the second step, the analysis is generalized for the presence of long shot bias. 
Similar to the case with fair odds, the main assumption is that the ratio * +⁄ , 
consistent with the indifference of the marginal bettor, is increasing with decreasing risk 
aversion. Thus, if I find a solution that does not satisfy this assumption I consider it to 
be inconsistent. 
 Figure 3.3: Eliciting risk preferences from bet size ratio under long shot bias 
 
Note: The figure depicts the difference of expected utility of betting on the favorite and betting on the 
underdog under long shot bias with the risk aversity parameter θ of the CARA utility function on the 
horizontal axis, given the bet size on the favorite and on the underdog. Long shot bias is present, i.e., odds 
on the favorite are 1.05 (with the probability of the favorite winning 90%), and odds on the underdog are 
7 (probability of winning 10%), leading to an expected return of -0.06% on the favorite and -0.3% on the 
underdog. 
 







Betting $160 on favorite and $10 on underdog
Betting $55 on favorite and $10 on underdog
Betting $45 on favorite and $10 on underdog
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As presented in Figure 3.3, there exists a range JM((' , M).(' K of risk parameter theta, 
which corresponds to inconsistent solutions (roots) of equation (3.4).8 In this range, the 
lower risk aversion is connected to lower bet size ratio, contradicting the basic 
assumption. To better illustrate the inconsistency, Figure 3.4 depicts 6 lines 
corresponding with decreasing θ from strongly risk-averse (line 1) to strongly risk-
loving (line 6) preferences. Moving away from strongly risk-averse preferences, the bet 
size ratio increases until it reaches its maximum (line 2), marked as ratio max in the 
figure for M  M).('  (from the previous Figure 3.3).  
Figure 3.4: Bet size ratio under long shot bias 
 
Note: The figure depicts the difference of expected utility of betting on the favorite and betting on the 
underdog under long shot bias with the bet size on the favorite on the horizontal axis, given the risk 
aversity parameter θ of the CARA utility function. The difference is illustrated on an example, where the 
probability of the favorite winning is 90% and the probability of the underdog winning is 10%. Lines are 
numbered from most risk averse (1) to least risk averse/most risk loving (6). 
Decreasing θ even further, the bet size ratio starts to decrease (lines 3, 4 and 5 in Figure 
3.4). These lines correspond to inconsistent values of θ within the range JM((' , M).(' K. 
Finally, starting at M(('  (representing risk-loving preferences), the bet size ratio starts 
increasing again (M D M((' ; line 6). At this point the bet size ratio has reached its 
                                                 
8 One can show that if equation (3.4) has one inconsistent solution, it  has a consistent solution (including 
the limit solution   ∞). 













q - incosistent solutions
q < 0 - risk loving
q = 0 - risk neutral












































minimum for risk-loving preferences, marked as ratio min in Figure 3.4. For the ratio of 
bets between (ratio max; ratio min), no solution to equation (3.4) exists.  
It should be stressed that the solution for constant bet size lies within the range 
of inconsistent solutions with M D 0 (Figure 3.3, thick dark line).  This has led authors 
who held to the constant bet assumption to the erroneous conclusion that bettors have to 
exhibit risk-loving preferences under EUT. 
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
The microstructure of Betfair as a typical betting exchange differs from the classic 
betting markets, and in certain respects it is more like financial markets. Every market 
on the exchange (for example the event on the winner of a horse race) consists of 
several outcomes with ex-ante objective probabilities of happening ?3, … , ?4. For every 
outcome of the event bettors have two options:  To place a bet that the outcome will 
happen – the back bet in Betfair terminology; or to place a bet that the outcome will not 
happen – the lay bet. The Betfair betting exchange is designed as an order-driven 
market where bettors can place either limit orders or market orders. Market order means 
that the bettor just chooses a side (buy or sell on classic markets, back or lay on Betfair), 
a particular outcome, and a bet size. The bet is then matched at the best possible price 
available on the market. Limit order means that the bettor is not satisfied with any 
market odds available at the moment and chooses not only the side, outcome, and 
volume, but also the odds at which he is willing to bet. The bet then waits on the market 
until it is matched by some other bettor. Therefore, when placing a limit order, the 
bettor has to decide whether to place a back or lay bet and has to stipulate the odds and 
bet size. On the other hand, when placing a market order, the bettor hits the odds 
already available on the market and chooses just the bet size and side of the market. 
Assume that the bettor decides to place a back bet (the outcome will happen) on 
outcome 1 of volume one dollar at odds @3. With probability ?3, outcome 1 occurs and 
the bet yields profitA1 B [C\3   A1 B [CA@3 B 1C, where [ is the commission (2−5%) 
that Betfair charges on the net winnings. If outcome 1 does not occur the bettor will lose 
one dollar. If the bettor places a lay bet (the outcome will not happen) on outcome 1 of 
volume one dollar at odds @3, the bet  yields profit A1 B [C dollars if  outcome 1 does 
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not occur and loss B\3 if  outcome 1 occurs. As I focus on those markets with one 
possible winner, the probabilities ?3, … , ?4 sum up to one. Thus, backing an outcome at 
odds is actually the same as laying all the other outcomes at respective odds.  
Generally, bettors may have different prior beliefs about the underlying 
probabilities of winning of the outcomes. However, they update their beliefs using 
market prices. Therefore, in equilibrium, all bettors can use the odds to infer the true 
underlying probabilities of the outcomes. Further, bettors can be divided into three main 
categories – common bettors, bookmakers, and traders. I assume that the majority of 
Betfair customers (more than 2 million people) may be characterized as common 
bettors, who typically bet only on one outcome and mostly place back market orders. I 
discuss this particular assumption and its implications on the results in the Appendix. 
The other two types of bettors – bookmakers and traders – are professional 
bettors who use the Betfair markets for making a profit. I assume that bookmakers post 
mostly large volume limit orders and only occasionally use market orders to balance 
their portfolios.9 I consider them to be risk neutral, as they basically try to balance their 
liabilities and earn a profit from the spread. The third type of bettor, traders, are similar 
to bookmakers. Their main concern, however, is not to make money from the spread but 
to identify arbitrage opportunities. Therefore, they place both limit and market orders, 
open and close their positions, and earn their profit from the differences of the asset 
price over time. These bettors are, therefore, usually placing large volume orders and 
the size of their bets is balanced with respect to the odds, i.e., they are also acting as 
risk-neutral bettors. 
In September 2008 Betfair introduced a new policy of “premium charges”, 
requiring customers who consistently win to pay at least 20% of their total profits in 
commission or other charges.  Although this rule was aimed at bookmakers and traders, 
Betfair claimed that it affected less than 0.5% of its customers. Since, according to this 
statement, bookmakers and traders make up less than 0.5% of all bettors, I direct my 
attention to the majority – common bettors – when analyzing the risk attitude of the 
general population of bettors. 
                                                 
9  In analyzing the in-trade soccer markets, Gil and Levitt (2007) point out that the endogenously emerged 
market makers were on one side of the trade for 65 percent when the markets were inplay, i.e. betting 
during the running event. 
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Due to the differences in market microstructure and in the behavior of bettors on 
different sports markets I analyze the tennis, soccer and horse race events separately. 
My empirical methodology follows the seminal paper of Jullien and Salanie (2000). For 
each event the common bettors face the following successive decisions:  
1) The bettor decides whether or not to bet; 
2) Conditional on the characteristics of the event, outcomes, and subjective 
probabilities of winning, the bettor decides how much he would be willing to 
bet on every outcome;  
3) After observing the odds the bettor chooses which outcome in the event he 
will bet on.  
The decisions in the first and second steps depend on both the event/outcome 
parameters and the personal characteristics of each bettor. All bettors have their own 
motives for betting and as no information about their personal characteristics is known, 
I do not model this decision. Further, I assume that the decisions of common bettors can 
be represented by the behavior of a representative agent – marginal bettor – with initial 
wealth M. The marginal bettor is able to anticipate from the equilibrium odds the true 
probability of winning of particular outcomes in the event.  Furthermore, under EUT, 
for every two outcomes i, j on the market with given odds @ and @, probabilities ? 
and ? , and average bet sizes  and , the marginal bettor with given utility function 
and risk preference parameter M is indifferent between betting on these two outcomes, 
such that 
?HAI . A1 B [C\, MC . A1 B ?CHAI B , MC
 ?HJI . A1 B [C\ , MK . J1 B ?KHJI B  , MK. 
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As I do not observe any information about the wealth or income of the marginal 
bettor, I use the CARA utility function in the form HAN, MC  J1 B %
, .K M⁄ ; otherwise  
the parameter estimates would be based either on the arbitrary choice of  wealth M, or  
would have to be estimated  as an additional parameter. Each ? is uniquely defined by 
the set of 5Q, \5Q, and M. Therefore, similarly as in Julienne and Salanie (2000),  M is 
estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation using formula (3.6) of the probability of 
the winning outcome. The likelihood function is then a sum of logs of probabilities for 
ex-post winners ?6 from each match: 






One of the key assumptions of alternative behavioral theories of decision making 
under uncertainty is that probabilities enter the formula of expected utility in a non-
linear form. In other words, bettors have a non-linear probability weighting function. It 
is possible, however, to test the validity of EUT without explicitly formalizing the 
alternative theories. If the assumption of a linear weighting function of EUT is correct, 
then the estimated risk aversion parameters of the marginal bettor should be the same 
regardless of the winning probabilities of players/teams/horses. Therefore, for each 
sport I draw two subsamples: one with the presence of strong favorites (and large 
differences in winning probabilities between outcomes) and the other without a favorite 
(and small differences in winning probabilities between outcomes).  Under the null 
hypothesis, EUT holds and therefore the estimates on the subsamples should not be 
statistically different from each other. If the results differ, EUT can be rejected in favor 









I use aggregated historical data from the world's largest betting exchange, Betfair, for all 
tennis, soccer and horse race winners’ markets between June 2004 and December 2008. 
All the studies described in Section 3.2 analyze the risk preferences of bettors only on 
horse race markets. However, horse race events usually consist of a large number of 
outcomes (horses) with a low probability of winning and only a few outcomes with a 
high probability of winning. This could lead to a situation in which I would estimate the 
risk preferences of bettors just on those bets with a low probability of winning. As 
pointed out by Forrest and McHale (2007), however, the tennis betting markets possess 
the nice feature of having a nearly complete distribution of events with outcomes over 
the whole probability range. Using data from the tennis and soccer markets, then, allows 
me to analyze the behavior of bettors facing the complete set of probabilities.  
For each outcome on every market and for each odds at which at least one bet 
was placed, the data from Betfair include information on the number of bets placed, 
total volume matched, date and time of the first and last matched bet on given odds, 
scheduled and actual start of the event, indicator of inplay bets10, and indicator of the 
winning outcome. Although on Betfair one can also place bets during the matches, I 
only use data on those bets that were placed before the start of the match or race, so as 
to analyze the ex-ante risk attitudes rather than the reaction of bettors to news from the 
ongoing match. 
Recent studies on the risk attitude of bettors (e.g. Jullien and Salanie, 2000; 
Ghandi, 2007) have employed starting prices - the odds valid at the start of the event. At 
betting exchange markets there are, however, always two values of odds – back and lay.  
Moreover, the odds tend to fluctuate even before the start of the event;  using just the 
final value of odds  would result in loss of  information about the volume matched and 
the number of bets placed at  odds slightly different than the final odds.11  I therefore 
use the weighted average of odds (by volume matched)  at which at least one bet was 
placed during the last two hours preceding the start of the match for soccer and tennis, 
and during the last five minutes preceding the start of the race for horse racing. The aim 
                                                 
10 Bets placed after the event has started. 
11 I effectively treat these small fluctuations as if the market was already in equilibrium. 
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was to determine a time interval reasonably long enough to encompass small 
fluctuations of odds around equilibrium, yet still short enough to screen out large 
changes of odds signaling that the market is not in equilibrium.12 The different lengths 
of time intervals for soccer, tennis, and horse racing reflect the different microstructure 
of the markets in these sports. Due to the lower number of soccer and tennis markets, as 
well as the lower number of outcomes on these markets and longer time intervals 
between these events, the odds on soccer and tennis markets do not often exhibit large 
fluctuations before the start of the event. 
The liquidity of Betfair markets varies tremendously, being as low as two bets 
with ₤4 volume matched to as high as 42,421 bets and ₤9,496,375 volume matched. 
Due to the lack of liquidity, I further restrict the analysis to those markets at which at 
least 20 bets have been placed on each outcome of the event.  In the case of tennis and 
soccer matches the number of outcomes is given, yet for horse races the number of 
outcomes differs for each race. Thus, to assure that  all the outcomes of horse race 
events are accounted for, I ruled out those events where the sum of imputed 
probabilities was lower than 0.98 and considered only those events where the total 
number of outcomes (horses) was lower or equal to 13.13 All these steps restricted the 
analysis to 17,371 tennis match winner markets, 70,831 soccer match winner markets, 
and 59,386 horse race winner markets. 
For further analysis of the risk preferences of marginal bettors, I use the average 
bet size computed as the volume matched over the number of bets from all odds at 
which at least one bet was made during the relevant time interval preceding the start of 
the event. The volume matched encompasses both the volume of market and limit 
matched orders on the back and lay side, and the number of bets is the sum of both back 
and lay bets. So, in fact, I use the average size of both back and lay bets. Average bet 
size varies remarkably with odds, suggesting that bettors bet different amounts on 
different odds, and justifying the importance of including the bet size in analysis. The 
average bet sizes for all three sports are presented in Figure 3.8 in the Appendix. 
                                                 
12 I considered intervals in the range of 2 minutes - 10 hours before the start of the match.  I chose the 
longest interval in which the average fluctuation of probability representation of odds (i.e. imputed 
probability equal to the inverse value of odds) was still lower than 3%. 
13 Races with more than 13 horses account for less than 8% of the total number of races. 
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With the available data I am not able to distinguish between the average back bet 
size and the average lay bet size as I do not have information on the number of back or 
lay orders. Thus, in further estimation I assume that the computed average bet size 
corresponds to the average back bet size. In the Appendix I provide a mathematical 
proof that under plausible assumptions on the behavior of bettors this approach delivers 
reliable and correctly interpreted estimation results.  
As pointed out before, a usual characteristic of betting market data is so-called 
favorite-long shot bias. Smith et al. (2006) suggest that favorite-long shot bias should be 
lower on betting exchanges. My data are consonant with this, as they exhibit smaller 
long shot bias on horse race markets (see Figure 3.5). Still, Figures 3.6 and 3.7 in the 
Appendix show the presence of fairly strong long shot bias on the tennis and soccer 
match winner markets.  
Figure 3.5: Expected return per dollar bet on horse races at Betfair 
 














Raw data: Aggregated by Imputed probability



































3.5 RESULTS  
In the first part, I focused on the importance of accounting for bet size in the 
analysis of risk preferences of bettors. As discussed above, when we use just price data, 
the estimates are driven solely by the long shot bias. In Table 3.1 the estimates of risk 
aversion for bettors, assuming constant bet size, are presented. The results indicate that 
the marginal bettor has risk-loving preferences, a finding similar to that of Jullien and 
Salanie (2000).  
 
Table 3.1: Estimates of risk aversion parameter of CARA utility function, 
assuming constant bet size 
Market θB s.d. p-value 95% CIlower 95% CIupper 
Tennis -0.036 0.0109 0.001 -0.0576 -0.0150 
Soccer -0.015 0.0046 0.001 -0.0244 -0.0063 
Horce races -0.003 0.0006 0.000 -0.0042 0.0017 
Note: number of observations used in the estimation: tennis – 17,371 obs., soccer – 70, 831 obs., horse 
races – 59,386 obs. 
 
Further, the estimated coefficient θB consist of both the parameter of risk 
aversion θ and the average bet size B, which is ₤20 for horse racing, ₤45 for soccer, and 
₤107 for tennis. This implies that the estimates of risk aversion parameter θ on different 
sports at Betfair are of comparable size, but all of them are significantly smaller than the 
estimates of Jullien and Salanie (2000). One reason may be the higher competition 
among bookmakers at Betfair markets, but also that as part of the data cleaning 
procedure I discarded all events with fewer than 20 bets on any of the outcomes and 
therefore screened out low liquidity markets, i.e. ones facing lower competition among 
bookmakers. 
As explained in Section 3.2, bet size is key to the analysis of bettors’ behavior, 
as bettors do not usually bet the same amount on different odds. Indeed, accounting for 
bet size dramatically changes the results for all sport types, as presented in Table 3.2. 
These differences between the markets on different sports raise questions about the 





Table 3.2: Estimates of risk aversion parameter of CARA utility function, 
accounting for different bet size 
Market θ s.d. p-value 95% CIlower 95% CIupper 
Tennis -0.0003 0.0002 0.225 -0.0009 0.0002 
Soccer 0.0001 0.0001 0.222 -0.0001 0.0003 
Horce races -0.0005 0.0001 0.000 -0.0006 -0.0004 
Note: number of observations used in the estimation: tennis – 17, 371 obs., soccer – 70, 831 obs., horse 
races  – 59, 386 obs. 
 
In the second step I test the key difference between EUT and behavioral theories, 
namely the assumption that bettors have a linear probability weighting function. If the 
EUT model of bettors’ behavior is correct, we should obtain the same estimates of risk 
preferences over the whole range of probabilities. Therefore, I draw two types of 
subsamples from the data on each sport. The first type is a subsample with favorites, 
where I condition the selection of events on the presence of a strong favorite. Due to the 
different number of outcomes in the particular sport14, I include the event in the sample 
only if there exist: (a) a tennis player with odds lower than 1.25 in tennis (imputed 
probability of winning greater than 80%); (b) a team with odds lower than 2.0 in soccer 
(imputed probability of winning greater than 50%); and (c) a horse with odds lower than 
3.0 in the horse race (imputed probability of winning greater than 33%). I use the odds 
as a proxy for the objective probabilities of winning. The second type of subsample 
consists of events without any favorite, i.e. I include the event in the sample only if both 
players have odds greater than 1.5 for tennis (imputed probability of winning lower than 
66%); if all outcomes have odds greater than 2.3 in soccer (imputed probability of 
winning lower than 43%); and if all horses in the race have odds greater than 4.0 in the 
horse races (imputed probability of winning lower than 25%). Under EUT, the risk 
preferences of the representative bettor should not differ regardless of whether he is 
betting on an event with a strong favorite or on an event without large differences in the 
winning probabilities of outcomes. Therefore, by comparing the results of the two types 
of subsamples I can easily test whether a marginal bettor has a linear weighting function 
of probabilities. 
                                                 
14 There are two players for tennis, three outcomes for soccer and usually more than six outcomes for 
horse races leading to significant differences in the objective probabilities of winning between the 
outcomes in these sports. 
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Table 3.3: Tennis markets - Estimates of risk aversion parameter of CARA utility 
function on subsamples defined by the presence of favorite, accounting for bet size 
Market θ s.d. p-value 95% CIlower 95% CIupper 
All events -0.0003 0.0002 0.225 -0.0009 0.0002 
- with favorites 0.0004 0.0004 0.277 -0.0003 0.0011 
- no favorites -0.0013 0.0005 0.007 -0.0023 -0.0004 
Note: number of observations used in the estimation: all events – 17,371 obs., with favorites – 4,101 obs., 
no favorites – 7,787 obs. 
 
Table 3.4: Soccer markets - Estimates of risk aversion parameter of CARA utility 
function on subsamples defined by the presence of favorite, accounting for bet size 
Market θ s.d. p-value 95% CIlower 95% CIupper 
All events 0.0001 0.0001 0.222 -0.0001 0.0003 
- with favorites 0.0003 0.0001 0.011 0.0001 0.0005 
- no favorites -0.0004 0.0002 0.030 -0.0008 -0.0001 
Note: number of observations used in the estimation: all events – 70,831 obs., with favorites – 31,287 
obs., no favorites – 23,162 obs. 
 
The results for tennis, soccer and horse races are presented in Tables 3.3–3.5.  
Estimates of the risk aversion parameter for the subsamples with a favorite and without 
a favorite are significantly different from each other for all three sports. I can therefore 
reject the null hypothesis of a linear probability weighting function in favor of its non-
linear counterparts.  Details of the estimation for particular sports are discussed below. 
Results for tennis and soccer indicate that the ratio of the bets on outcomes with 
small differences in probabilities is higher than the ratio consistent with the behavior of 
risk-neutral bettors. This might suggest that people overweight small differences in 
probabilities. On the other hand, the opposite is true on markets with strong favorites, 
where the ratio of the amount placed on the more probable outcome to the amount 
placed on the less probable outcome is lower in comparison with risk-neutral bettors. 
This might suggest that people either underweight large differences in probabilities or 
simply underweight the large probabilities near the reference point 1. Another possible 
explanation is that bettors have restrictions on their maximum bet size; that is, when the 
model of risk-neutral bettors implies remarkably high bets for high probable outcomes, 
the maximum bet size may function as a binding constraint, resulting in a significantly 
lower bet ratio of bets on events with strong favorites than on events without any 
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favorites. In both cases, however, I can reject the hypothesis that the marginal bettor at 
Betfair has a linear weighting function of probabilities. 
These results bring further insight to the theories of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992). They assume that people underweight large probabilities and overweight small 
probabilities, i.e., that zero and certainty serve as reference points from which people 
offset their perception of probabilities. My results suggest that even particular outcomes 
serve each other as reference points, which leads to observed overweighting of small 
differences in probabilities and underweighting of large differences in probabilities. 
 
Table 3.5: Horse race markets - Estimates of risk aversion parameter of CARA 
utility function on subsamples defined by the presence of favorite, accounting for 
bet size 
Market θ Std.dev. p-value 95% CIlower 95% CIupper 
All events -0.0005 0.0001 0.000 -0.0006 0.0004 
- with favorites -0.0008 0.0001 0.000 -0.0009 -0.0007 
- no favorites -0.0002 0.0001 0.109 -0.0004 0.0001 
Note: number of observations used in the estimation: all events – 59,386 obs., with favorites – 27,516 
obs., no favorites – 14, 359 obs. 
 
The results from horse racing markets also support the observation that bettors 
do not weight probabilities linearly. However, as suggested by the results in the first 
step, in the case of horse races the behavior of bettors seems to follow a different pattern 
than in tennis or soccer.  Bettors still slightly overweight the small differences between 
probabilities of winning of horses in events without any strong favorite, yet they 
overweight the middle-sized differences in probabilities between underdogs and 
favorites even more. The rationale for this result lies in the higher number of outcomes 
on the horse race market and thus the lower absolute values of implied probabilities as 
well as their differences. In such a market structure, unlike the tennis and soccer 
markets, the implied probabilities never cross the threshold where the underweighting 







3.6 CONCLUSION  
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on decision making 
under risk and uncertainty. Using an extensive dataset from the world’s largest betting 
exchange, Betfair, I show that bettors bet different amounts on different odds, and that 
bet size is key to explaining their attitude towards risk.  I abandon the assumption of 
constant bet size commonly used in the literature and provide corrected estimates of the 
risk preferences of bettors which, indeed, differ significantly from previous studies. 
This research also has broader implications for the general analysis of behavior 
under uncertainty, particularly for discussions regarding the validity of EUT. My results 
suggest that, when facing a number of outcomes with different winning probabilities, 
bettors tend to overweight small and underweight large differences in probabilities, 
which is in direct contradiction to the linear probability weighting function implied by 
EUT. These findings can be presented as a refinement on Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992), who report the same behavior of agents with respect to absolute values of 
probabilities. My results also support the theory of reference points in decision making 
under uncertainty. However, they indicate that people may use more reference points 
than the generally accepted 0 and 1, as the outcomes might serve as each other’s 
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3.8 APPENDIX  
I assume that bookmakers and traders act as risk-neutral agents and that their orders are 
larger than the orders of common bettors.15 On the other hand, common bettors who just 
choose the outcome mostly place back market orders. As the first two types of bettors 
are risk neutral, the estimates will be driven by the risk preferences of the common 
bettors, and will be biased towards risk neutrality. I assume that all common bettors are 
placing back bets, i.e., betting that a particular player will win, and that matching of the 
bets is done mostly by bookmakers who stand outside the model. Nevertheless, on real 
betting exchanges the common bettors can be observed on both sides of the market. In 
further text I analyze the effect of the simplifying assumption on the validity of the 
results. 
Let us assume that proportion m of all bets are backs and 1-m are lays. Given the 
total number of bets on a favorite (_*) and an underdog (_+) I can compute the 
corresponding number of backs (* and +) and lays (^* and ^+) as 
 
` *  a_*   ` ^*  A1 B aC_* 
` +  a_+   ` ^+  A1 B aC_+ 
 
Because there are only two players and I assume that odds @* and @+ are fair, it holds 
that @*  88
3 and \* 
3
9
. Thus, I can express the cross-relations between the 
average back bet (*, +) and lay bet (^*, ^+) on the favorite and the underdog, 
respectively, as 
^*  +A@+ B 1C  ^+  *A@* B 1C 
Total matched volumes on the favorite and the underdog (b@^*, b@^+) are equal to 
b@^*  b@^* . b@^:* ` ** .` ^*^*  a_** . A1 B aC_*^*  
 a_** . A1 B aC_*+A@+ B 1C 
b@^+  b@^+ . b@^:+ ` ++ .` ^+^+  a_++ . A1 B aC_+^+  
 a_++ . A1 B aC_+*A@* B 1C 
Solving for * and + gives 
                                                 
15 On Betfair, the volume of a lay order is defined not as the liability of a lay bettor, but as his profit 





A1 B aC_*A@+ B 1Cb@^+ B a_+b@^*
_*_+A1 B 2aC  
+ 
A1 B aC_+A@* B 1Cb@^* B a_*b@^+
_*_+A1 B 2aC  
I am interested in how the average back bet size changes with a different proportion of 
backing bettors on the market. Taking derivatives of * and + with respect to m I get 
d*
da 
_*A@+ B 1Cb@^+ B _+b@^*
_*_+A1 B 2aC;  d+
da 
_+A@* B 1Cb@^* B _*b@^+
_*_+A1 B 2aC;  
d*























where *'%$  <8:4  and +
'%$  <8:
4
 denote the average back bet sizes under the 
assumption that m = 1, i.e., that all bettors are backing, which I used in my estimates. 
* #+) + are continuous on the range of a f A 0.5; 1i . Therefore if If a E 0.5 and the 






?+  A@+ B 1C 
                            A@+ B 1C E *
'%$
+'%$






?*  A@* B 1C 
                             A@* B 1C D +
'%$
*'%$
j d+da D 0 & =0.?klllllm + E +
'%$ 






                                                 










means that use of the right average back bet size would lead to an even higher risk 
aversion estimate. Similarly, if the results suggest that the marginal bettor is risk loving, 





?+  A@+ B 1C 
                            A@+ B 1C D *
'%$
+'%$






?*  A@* B 1C 
                             A@* B 1C E +
'%$
*'%$








In both cases, use of average betting size computed under the assumption that m = 1 
biases the results towards risk-neutral preferences. Thus, as long as the real proportion 
of common bettors on the back side of the market is higher than 0.5, it is reasonable to 
conclude that my estimate of risk aversion/risk love is a lower/upper bound of a real 
value. 
I have also performed an empirical check of my assumptions through the 
analysis of bets on 60 markets of the 2006 soccer World Cup for which I have available 
information on the number of back and lay bets. According to this data, the share of 
"backers" on the market orders is larger than the share of "layers". The share of back 
bets ranges from 60% to 90% with an average 73% share of all observed bets for 180 
outcomes (3 outcomes per market) of match winner markets, and ranges from 60% to 
96% with an average 86% share of all observed bets for 1020 outcomes (17 outcomes 
per market) of the correct score markets. The average lay bet sizes are always 






Figure 3.6: Expected return per dollar bet on tennis at Betfair 
 
Note: number of observations used: 17,371. 
 
Figure 3.7: Expected return per Dollar Bet on Soccer at Betfair 
 











Raw data: Aggregated by Imputed probability







































Raw data: Aggregated by Imputed probability
































Figure 3.8: Average bet size at Betfair with respect to imputed probability 
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